THE ROLLBACK OF LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete.     

Squad leaders today,village leaders tomorrow: Muslim auxiliaries and tactical politics in Algeria, 1956–1962

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

Expeditionary police advising: some causes of failure

ABSTRACT

The practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject.     

Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.     

Influence of thickness and projectile shape on penetration resistance of the compliant composite

The present study deals with development of conceptual proof for jute rubber basedflexible composite block to completely arrest the projectile impacting the target at high velocity impact of 400 m/s through numerical simulation approach using finite element (FE) method. The proposed flexible composite blocks of repeating jute/rubber/jute (JRJ) units are modelled with varying thickness from 30 mm to 120 mm in increments of 30 mm and impacted by flat (F), ogival (O) and hemispherical (HS) shaped projectiles. All the considered projectiles are impacted with proposed flexible composite blocks of different thicknesses and the penetration behaviour of the projectile in each case is studied. The penetration depth of the projectile in case of partially penetrated cases are considered and the effect of thickness and projectile shape on percentage of penetration depth is statistically analyzed using Tagu-chi's design of experiments (DOE). Results reveal that the though proposedflexible composite block with thickness of 90 mm is just sufficient to arrest the complete penetration of the projectile, considering the safety issues, it is recommended to use theflexible composite with thickness of 120 mm. The nature of damage caused by the projectile in the flexible composite is also studied. Statistical studies show that thickness of the block plays a prominent role in determining the damage resistance of the flexible composite.