Comment: Why “an identified systemic model of the democracy‐peace nexus” does not persuade*

In their article in this journal, James, Solberg and Wolfson (1999) challenge our findings that two states are more likely to have peaceful relations if they are both democratic. They claim to develop a simultaneous system of two equations showing that peace and democracy foster each other, and that the effect of peace in encouraging democracy is stronger than that of democracy on peace. Their analysis, however, is flawed. Their research design employs measures of dispute and joint democracy that are inferior to those now common in the literature, and their equation for predicting peace is not properly specified. These problems distort their results. Even so, their results provide evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy. Analyses we conduct with a more completely specified model reveal stronger support for the democratic “ peace. Furthermore, a test of the effect of interstate conflict on democracy should be done at the national (or monadic) level of analysis; but James et al. perform a dyadic analysis. In a monadic test using vector autoregression, we find that disputes make no contribution to explaining the character of regimes. Even with their dyadic method, their finding that peace promotes democracy is not robust Including a crucial control variable, the ratio of militarily relevant national capabilities, that James et al. omitted, dramatically alters their findings.     

IFR results for repairable systems

Consider a k-out-of-n system with independent repairable components. Assume that the repair and failure distributions are exponential with parameters {μ₁, ?,μ_n} and {λ₁, ?,λ_n}, respectively. In this article we show that if λ_i – μ_i = Δ for all i then the life distribution of the system is increasing failure rate (IFR).     

Revenue management with aircraft reassignment flexibility

A well‐studied problem in airline revenue management is the optimal allocation of seat inventory among different fare‐classes, given a capacity for the flight and a demand distribution for each class. In practice, capacity on a flight does not have to be fixed; airlines can exercise some flexibility on the supply side by swapping aircraft of different capacities between flights as partial booking information is gathered. This provides the airline with the capability to more effectively match their supply and demand. In this paper, we study the seat inventory control problem considering the aircraft swapping option. For theoretical and practical purposes, we restrict our attention to the class of booking limit policies. Our analytical results demonstrate that booking limits considering the swapping option can be considerably different from those under fixed capacity. We also show that principles on the relationship between the optimal booking limits and demand characteristics (size and risk) developed for the fixed‐capacity problem no longer hold when swapping is an option. We develop new principles and insights on how demand characteristics affect the optimal booking limits under the swapping possibility. We also develop an easy to implement heuristic for determining the booking limits under the swapping option and show, through a numerical study, that the heuristic generates revenues close to those under the optimal booking limits. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Book reviews

John Horsfield, The Art of Leadership in War. The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. 240; £14.75.

John Joseph Timothy Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini's Army, 1920–1940. Westport, Connecticut &; London: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 207; £15.50.

Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper. Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P., 1980. Pp. 328; £8.60.

Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pp. 425; $15.00.

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government and its Discontents. New York: Basic Books, and London: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 202; £7.95.

Seweryn Bialer (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1981. Pp. 441; £14.95.

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. 175; £12.00 (hb.) and £3.95 (pb.)

Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968–1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980. Pp. 967; £39.95.

Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–47; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980. Pp. 254; £14.50;

Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab‐Israeli Conflict; Psychological Obstacles to Peace. Oslo: Universittsforlaget, 1979. Pp. 234; £11.60;

Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision‐making; Israel's Security Choices 1967. Columbus. Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 1980. Pp. 399; $35.     

China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean

This article argues that an increasingly sea-power-minded China will neither shelter passively in coastal waters, nor throw itself into competition with the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Rather, Beijing will direct its energies toward South and Southeast Asia, where supplies of oil, natural gas, and other commodities critical to China's economic development must pass. There China will encounter an equally sea-power-minded India that enjoys marked geostrategic advantages. Beijing will likely content itself with ‘soft power’ diplomacy in these regions until it can settle the dispute with Taiwan, freeing up resources for maritime endeavors farther from China's coasts.     

Research communication

A UK House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) Report on the Gulf War recommended that the UK should be self‐sufficient in supporting its Armed Forces in times of crisis and not even rely on its Allies. This recommendation is at odds with UK Government policy which rejects any formal strategy of support for the defence industrial base preferring international open competition as its procurement philosophy. This paper examines the various factors ranging from the supply of raw materials, production capacity, stockpiling, international joint ventures, and competition through to the effects on the technological update of weapon systems resulting from this philosophy. It draws conclusions supporting the HCDC recommendation and calls for joint MOD‐Industry action to address the issues involved and thereby reduce the risks to the Defence of the Realm.     

Rent seeking and defence expenditure

A plethora of arguments from the ‘public choice school’ suggest that public goods are ‘under‐supplied’ by comparison with public sector provision of more private goods. The implication is that rent seeking by the ‘military‐industrial complex’ serves, in some measure, to offset potential allocative inefficiency. In this paper a comparison of rent seeking by producers of public goods and producers of private goods identifies a bias that favours public good supply. The bias results from the different way in which collective demand for public goods and for private goods is expressed. The prospect of larger rents to the ‘military‐industrial complex’ implies greater rent‐seeking expenditures in this sector. The extent to which public goods (and, in particular, defence) are ‘under supplied’ is much exaggerated.