Transshipment through crossdocks with inventory and time windows

A major challenge in making supply meet demand is to coordinate transshipments across the supply chain to reduce costs and increase service levels in the face of demand fluctuations, short lead times, warehouse limitations, and transportation and inventory costs. In particular, transshipment through crossdocks, where just‐in‐time objectives prevail, requires precise scheduling between suppliers, crossdocks, and customers. In this work, we study the transshipment problem with supplier and customer time windows where flow is constrained by transportation schedules and warehouse capacities. Transportation is provided by fixed or flexible schedules and lot‐sizing is dealt with through multiple shipments. We develop polynomial‐time algorithms or, otherwise, provide the complexity of the problems studied. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

A chessboard model of the U‐boat war in the Atlantic with applications to signals intelligence

This paper uses a simple Monte Carlo model to analyze the influence of signals intelligence on the Second World War's Battle of the Atlantic. The principle measure of effectiveness is the number of U‐boat days of attack to which convoys were subjected. A secondary measure is the number of convoyed ships sunk. The model is validated against historical data and then used to explore the effectiveness of the two sides' signals intelligence. Allied use of signals intelligence is shown to have been capable of completely offsetting German use of signals intelligence, and then some. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

The Enfield Lock Barrel Mill of 1815 and Moves to Replace Musket Barrel Grinding by Turning c1780 to c1840

In 1841 Henry Wilkinson in his book Engines of War and William Greener in The Science of Gunnery describe a range of methods then in use for shaping the outside of gun barrels after the barrel forging process, ranging from manual off-hand grinding to the use of precision machines. In the same year G. & J. Rennie published the design of their state-of-the-art lathe that was capable of turning complex and dished barrel forms. This built upon the earlier work of both Henry Nock and John Jones. In the early years of the 19th century both Britain, at Enfield and other locations, and the USA, at Harpers Ferry and Springfield, began to introduce barrel-turning technology. This paper uses measurements taken from a significant number of military barrels made by several makers, and also newly exposed information about Henry Nock and the Enfield Factory of 1815, to understand better the technologies that were applied to military flintlock barrel finishing from the 1780s to the 1840s, and particularly during the major wars of 1793–1815, when high output was paramount. Measurements both of barrel form and out-of-roundness are presented. These allow the interpretation of the techniques being used by different makers at different locations, and raise questions about the purpose and achievement of the complex dished barrel forms found on British military flintlock muskets. This approach also allows us to better describe the earliest factory on the Enfield site, one of the most significant sites in the wider history of UK manufacturing.     

Disruption‐management strategies for short life‐cycle products

Supplier diversification, contingent sourcing, and demand switching (whereby a firm shifts customers to a different product if their preferred product is unavailable), are key building blocks of a disruption‐management strategy for firms that sell multiple products over a single season. In this article, we evaluate 12 possible disruption‐management strategies (combinations of the basic building‐block tactics) in the context of a two‐product newsvendor. We investigate the influence of nine attributes of the firm, its supplier(s), and its products on the firs preference for the various strategies. These attributes include supplier reliability, supplier failure correlation, payment responsibility in the event of a supply failure, product contribution margin, product substitutability, demand uncertainties and correlation, and the decision makes risk aversion. Our results show that contingent sourcing is preferred to supplier diversification as the supply risk (failure probability) increases, but diversification is preferred to contingent sourcing as the demand risk (demand uncertainty) increases. We find that demand switching is not effective at managing supply risk if the products are sourced from the same set of suppliers. Demand switching is effective at managing demand risk and so can be preferred to the other tactics if supply risk is low. Risk aversion makes contingent sourcing preferable over a wider set of supply and demand‐risk combinations. We also find a two‐tactic strategy provides almost the same benefit as a three‐tactic strategy for most reasonable supply and demand‐risk combinations. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018

ABSTRACT

Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.