The myth of intrinsic combat motivation

In military studies, the most contentious arguments about human resources are associated with combat motivations. The trouble with the existing literature is that two distrinctions are routinely ignored: the distinction between combat motivation and the motivation to serve; and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. A review within the terms of these distinctions suggests that the literature, particularly the American literature, exaggerates intrinsic motivations. Motivations to serve, which are intrinsic, are not completely transitive with combat motivations, which are largely extrinsic. An emphasis on intrinsic motivations can even be counter-productive, encourageing, at best, myopia and, at worst, atrocities.     

The rationality of terrorism and other forms of political violence: lessons from the Jewish campaign in Palestine, 1939–1947

Does terrorism work? Its targets and victims steadfastly maintain that it does not; its practitioners and apologists that it does. Scholars and analysts are divided. But, if terrorism is as ineffective as many claim, why has it persisted for at least the past two millennia and indeed become an increasingly popular means of violent political expression in the twenty-first century? Using the Jewish terrorist campaign against the British in Palestine during the 1940s, this article attempts to shed light on this question. It concludes that notwithstanding the repeated denials of governments, terrorism can, in the right conditions and with the appropriate strategy and tactics, indeed ‘work’. At minimum, even if terrorism's power to dramatically change the course of history (along the lines of the 11 September 2001 attacks) has been mercifully infrequent; terrorism's ability to act as a catalyst or fulminate for either wider conflagration or systemic political change appears historically undeniable.     

Rent‐seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation*

This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent‐seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances.     

Scheduling recurrent construction

A problem we call recurrent construction involves manufacturing large, complex, expensive products such as airplanes, houses, and ships. Customers order configurations of these products well in advance of due dates for delivery. Early delivery may not be permitted. How should the manufacturer determine when to purchase and release materials before fabrication, assembly, and delivery? Major material expenses, significant penalties for deliveries beyond due dates, and long product makespans in recurrent construction motivate choosing a release timetable that maximizes the net present value of cash flows. Our heuristic first projects an initial schedule that dispatches worker teams to tasks for the backlogged products, and then solves a series of maximal closure problems to find material release times that maximize NPV. This method compares favorably with other well‐known work release heuristics in solution quality for large problems over a wide range of operating conditions, including order strength, cost structure, utilization level, batch policy, and uncertainty level. Computation times exhibit near linear growth in problem size. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004     

Dealing with disputes in Afghanistan: principles and rules for the tactical level

This article addresses the principles that should guide commanders, and the rules they must adhere to, when dealing with community disputes in Afghanistan. An important feature of these principles and rules is that they have been developed to ensure that coalition forces minimize the harm caused to the local population; and that members of the coalition do not violate their own laws and policies. The principles and rules have also been developed to be consistent with counterinsurgency guidance as practiced in Afghanistan. The article concludes with a number of ‘Dos and Don'ts’ concerning dispute settlement that are relevant for coalition forces dealing with disputes at the tactical level. The article also has two appendices, which are intended to guide commanders to better understand dispute settlement systems in Afghanistan.