AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL OF CAPITAL AND ARMS ACCUMULATION

This paper attempts to examine the effect of an anticipated foreign military threat on the steady‐state growth rate and the transitional behavior of the economy. The modeling strategy follows the Sandler and Hartley (1995 Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. 1995. The Economics of Defense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar]) and Dunne et al. (2005 Dunne, J.P., Smith, R.P. and Willenbockel, D. 2005. Models of military expenditure and growth: a critical review. Defence and Peace Economics, 16: 449–461. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) viewpoints to emphasize the role of national defense in affecting growth from the perspective of both the demand and the supply sides. We thus combine the public capital version of endogenous growth with a framework of competitive arms accumulation. It is found that the key factor determining the steady state and the transitional effects of a rise in the foreign military threat on the home weapon–capital ratio, the consumption–capital ratio, and the rate of economic growth, is the degree of relative risk aversion.     

TERRORIST THREATS AND TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL

Previous research has shown that the duration of a civil war is in part a function of how it ends: in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement. We present a model of how protagonists in a civil war choose to stop fighting. Hypotheses derived from this theory relate the duration of a civil war to its outcome as well as characteristics of the civil war and the civil war nation. Findings from a competing risk model reveal that the effects of predictors on duration vary according to whether the conflict ended in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement.     

Property distribution and configurations of sovereign states: A rational economic model

A nation's wealth is both an object of conquest to covetous aggressors and a resource to its owners for self defense. To maintain autonomy every country must mount a defense which either makes its capture (1) more expensive than any aggressor can afford, or (2) more expensive than it is worth to aggressors. Whether this condition can be satisfied for all countries simultaneously depends as shown in this paper on relative efficacy of military offense versus defense, the aggregate of wealth among nations and its distribution, and the benefits a conqueror may obtain from conquest, including the duration of these benefits. The paper shows how these factors fit together to determine the sustainability and stability of the international distribution of property as embodied in the configuration of sovereign states.     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

Limiting cyberwarfare: applying arms-control models to an emerging technology

ABSTRACT

An arms race in cyberspace is underway. US and Western government efforts to control this process have largely been limited to deterrence and norm development. This article examines an alternative policy option: arms control. To gauge whether arms-control models offer useful lessons for addressing cyber capabilities, this article compiles a new dataset of predominantly twentieth-century arms-control agreements. It also evaluates two case studies of negotiated agreements that regulate dual-use technologies, the 1928 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical- and biological-weapon use and the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. The analysis underscores the limits of norm development for emerging technologies with both civilian and military applications. It finds lessons for developing verifiable, international cooperation mechanisms for cyberwarfare in the regulatory model of international aviation. Conventionally, arms-control agreements take advantage of transparent tests or estimates of arms. To restrict cyberwarfare activities, experts and policy makers must adapt arms-control models to a difficult-to-measure technology at an advanced stage of development and use. Further investigation of international regulatory schemes for dual-use technology of similar diffusion and development to the internet, such as international civil aviation, is needed.     

Endogenous Growth and Defense Expenditures: A New Explanation of the Benoit Hypothesis

This paper develops an endogenous growth model to examine the linkage between military expenditures and economic growth. We adopt the modeling strategy where both the supply side and the demand side effects of national defense are taken into considerations. Our result finds that a rise in military spending tends to stimulate the sustained growth rate, confirming Benoit's famous empirical findings.     

External security determinants of Greek military expenditure: An empirical investigation using Neural networks

Greece has regularly ranked as the country with the highest defence burden in NATO and the European Union. Over the past decades she has allocated an averatge 6% of GDP to defence yearly. This study using neural networks examines the external security determinants of Greek military expenditure in the context of the ongoing Greek‐Turkish conflict.