Horizontal Inequalities and Sons of the Soil Conflict in China

Why are large population movements conflict-prone in some regions while they remain peacefully integrated elsewhere? I argue that clashes between ethnically distinct indigenous populations and migrants – i.e. ‘Sons of the Soil (SoS) conflict’ – erupt when there are large socio-economic and political horizontal inequalities between ‘dominant migrants’ and locals. A comparative case study of two Chinese minority regions based on ethnographic fieldwork and population data provides a vivid illustration of the mechanisms linking migration to SoS conflict. With fewer HIs between migrants and locals, Inner Mongolia avoided many of the violent clashes that were commonplace in Qinghai, a province fraught with disparities.     

Radar pulse interleaving for multi‐target tracking

In a multifunction radar, the maximum number of targets that can be managed or tracked is an important performance measure. Interleaving algorithms developed to operate radars exploit the dead‐times between the transmitted and the received pulses to allocate new tracking tasks that might involve transmitting or receiving pulses, thus increasing the capacity of the system. The problem of interleaving N targets involves a search among N! possibilities, and suboptimal solutions are usually employed to satisfy the real‐time constraints of the radar system. In this paper, we present new tight 0–1 integer programming models for the radar pulse interleaving problem and develop effective solution methods based on Lagrangian relaxation techniques. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

The (s,Q) inventory model with Erlang lead time and deterministic demand

We develop a simple, approximately optimal solution to a model with Erlang lead time and deterministic demand. The method is robust to misspecification of the lead time and has good accuracy. We compare our approximate solution to the optimal for the case where we have prior information on the lead‐time distribution, and another where we have no information, except for computer‐generated sample data. It turns out that our solution is as easy as the EOQ's, with an accuracy rate of 99.41% when prior information on the lead‐time distribution is available and 97.54–99.09% when only computer‐generated sample information is available. Apart from supplying the inventory practitioner with an easy heuristic, we gain insights into the efficacy of stochastic lead time models and how these could be used to find the cost and a near‐optimal policy for the general model, where both demand rate and lead time are stochastic. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004     

Stochastically minimizing the makespan in flow shops

In this article, we are concerned with scheduling stochastic jobs in a flowshop with m machines and zero intermediate storage. We assume that there are n - 2 identically distributed and 2 fast stochastic jobs. Roughly, the main result states that the makespan is stochastically minimized by placing one of the fast jobs first and the other last.     

Clustering in defence-related procurement: the case of a Belgian naval construction cluster

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the importance of closer co-operation in defence-related procurement. Led by the decision that Belgium will lead the procurement of 12 Mine CounterMeasures Vessels (MCMV), the case of a potential Belgian naval construction cluster is discussed. The feasibility of a potential cluster is investigated by looking at key elements of a successful naval construction cluster, the Dutch naval construction cluster, and comparing those key elements to the current Belgian situation. Forming a sustainable Belgian naval construction cluster will be difficult. Most of the procurement process of the MCMVs is set on a European tender. In the long run, due to the absence of both a launching customer and leader firms, no party is able to carry the cluster with investments and knowledge spill-overs. In order to keep public support for large defence-related investments, clustering around the MCMV integration system and proactive cluster support is recommended.     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Glimpse into an army at its peak: notes on the Somali National Army in the 1960–80s

ABSTRACT

Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham correctly argue that the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official security institutions in Africa have been somewhat neglected, with a lack of much recent research. The Somali National Army (SNA) sits among these lacunae. Its formal structures can be used as a skeletal starting point and springboard to start to draw the network diagrams that chart informal linkages. This is why recent declassification decisions by U.S. intelligence bodies, coupled with period documents released to the UK National Archives, hold significance in helping us understand early hierarchical SNA arrangements. They show the steady build-up in size of the force, to 1987, to about the time the civil war began to fragment the state.