水下目标跟踪粒子滤波算法性能分析

粒子滤波(PF)、扩展粒子滤波(EPF)和无迹粒子滤波(UPF)在非线性状态估计方面表现出更好的性能.分析了PF、EPF、UPF 3种算法,UPF的估计状态依赖于测量值,对历史模型信息的敏感度较低,并避免了雅可比矩阵的计算,比EPF更容易进行模型设计;EPF在计算上虽然高效,但跟踪效果不稳定.以AUV水下三维目标跟踪为...     

等离子喷涂Ni基合金涂层热腐蚀行为研究

为探究Ni基合金涂层的热腐蚀防护机理,采用等离子喷涂法在304不锈钢表面制备了NiCr和NiAl两种合金涂层,以75％Na2SO4+25％NaCl的混合盐溶液为腐蚀介质,研究了涂层在700℃下的热腐蚀情况.分别使用扫描电子显微镜、X射线衍射仪对涂层的热腐蚀形貌和晶相变化进行表征,并绘制了涂层的热腐蚀动力学曲线.结果表明...     

A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPLY

Hatzinikolaou raises a number of issues related mainly to the econometrics of our paper. These issues are categorized according to the three stages of econometric analysis: specification, estimation, and diagnostic checking. We categorize our reply to his comments accordingly.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.