磁悬浮隔振系统的行为与分析

磁悬浮隔振是一种新型的主动式隔振技术。文中首先对磁悬浮隔振系统做一般性的说明,然后以自行研制的磁悬浮隔振试验装置为对象,分析了磁悬浮隔振的机理和特性;论述了磁悬浮隔振系统的建模和控制策略;最后对磁悬浮隔振系统运行与特性进行分析并给出了分析结果和仿真结果的比较。     

分布式火控系统实时通信的设计实现

实时可靠的通信系统是实现分布式火控的关键。介绍了在一个小型实时通信系统的设计中,为保证通信的实时性采取了节拍控制、数据分级、重发限制等方法,为提高通信可靠性采用了断路重组技术、差错控制和冗余技术,软件采用了面向对象分层次模块化设计的方法,提高了可维性和可扩展性。通过这些措施,实现了5km距离内数据和语音的多点实时传输,误码率小于10-6,通信时延小于150ms,满足了分布式火控系统的要求。     

小水线面双体船横摇阻尼特性数值与试验研究

针对安装稳定鳍的小水线面双体船开展了零速静水自由横摇衰减数值与试验研究。通过不确定度分析验证数值计算方法的可靠性,进而对比船体的线性横摇阻尼和非线性横摇阻尼,并分析摩擦阻尼和稳定鳍对小水线面双体船横摇恢复力矩的影响规律。结果表明:由数值计算求得的自由横摇衰减曲线与试验结果吻合良好;在线性横摇运动假设下,线性横摇阻尼系数随着初始横倾角的增加而增大;将通过数值计算求得的非线性阻尼系数代入到非线性横摇运动方程中能准确地模拟船体的自由横摇衰减运动;摩擦阻尼和稳定鳍对小水线面双体船零速静水自由横摇时的横摇恢复力矩贡献很小。     

国家安全中枢的构筑——对十八届三中全会决定“设立国家安全委员会”的解读

国家安全委员会具有“内外兼备”的基本职能,即：将维护国家安全与创新社会治理、创新有效预防和化解社会矛盾体制、健全公共安全体系等内政事务并列并举,在维护国内安全稳定方面也肩负重任。它较之现今的“国安领导小组”更为广泛和重要,是一个应对有别于国家日常工作之外的应急的危机管理机构,是应对可能的、突发的、潜在的对国家安全、利益构成威胁的前瞻性机构。     

Does Military Spending Really Matter for Economic Growth in China and G7 Countries: The Roles of Dependency and Heterogeneity

This study revisits the causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in China and G7 countries (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) by focusing country-specific analysis for the period 1988–2010. The panel causality analysis, which accounts for both cross-country dependency and heterogeneity across countries, is employed in this study. Our results find evidence of the neutrality hypothesis for Italy, France, and Germany, the military spending–growth detriment hypothesis for both Canada and the UK, and one-way Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for China. Furthermore, we find a feedback between military spending and economic growth in both Japan and the USA. Thus, our results do not support that one size fits all.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

装备保障抽组力量物资装载模型

对装备保障抽组力量的物资装载问题进行了数学描述,建立了以实现全部物资尽量分散装载为目标,以同类物资集中装载、车辆承载物资总体积不超过车辆有效容积、车辆承载物资总重量不超过车辆标记载重量、物资必须装载且不被重复装载等为主要约束的数学模型,并进行了求解.最后通过实例解算验证了模型的有效性.     

集对分析法在作战仿真结果分析中的应用研究

提出了集对分析法的概念,详细讨论了集对分析法对多指标问题的评估步骤、方法及特点.文章最后运用该方法对一个分队作战仿真实例进行了综合分析评估,证明了集对分析法简单、实用、有效.     

制导武器控制系统设计

随着信息时代的来临,网络中心战正日益成为新的作战样式,作战行动不再是以武器为平台的单元与单元的对抗,而是以网络为中心的作战平台体系之间的对抗.以网络中心战为背景,为减小网络介入带来的传输时延对网络中心战整体性能的影响,针对制导武器控制系统,设计了基于随机网络时延的切换控制器,并利用线性矩阵不等式(LMI)给出了保证各子系统各自稳定且之间切换稳定的控制器参数的求解方法.最后,给出具体的仿真实例,通过对比验证了所提切换控制器的有效性.