Warranty design under buyer and seller risk aversion

This paper provides a framework in which warranty policies for non-repairable items can be evaluated according to risk preferences of both buyers and sellers. In particular, a warranty price schedule is established such that sellers are indifferent among the policies. Given this schedule, a buyer's response is expressed by selecting the price-warranty combination that minimizes disutility. Within this framework, a warranty can be viewed as an instrumet of risk management that can induce more sales and greater profitability. For given utility functions, analytical results for the development of a price schedule are developed. Numerical results illustrate the substitution effects between warranty terms, prices, and risk parameters.     

Parallel machine replacement

We consider the parallel replacement problem in which there are both fixed and variable costs associated with replacing machines. Increasing maintenance costs motivate replacements, and the fixed replacement cost provides incentive for replacing machines of different ages together in “clusters.” We prove two intuitive results for this problem. First, it is never optimal to split a cluster of like-aged machines, and second, it is never optimal to replace newer clusters before older clusters. By incorporating these two results into an algorithmic approach, we vastly reduce the amount of computation required to identify an optimal replacement policy.     

A one-dimensional helicopter-submarine game

The article considers a two-person zero-sum game in which a searcher with b bombs wishes to destroy a mobile hider. The players are restricted to move on a straight line with maximum speeds v and u satisfying v > u > 0; neither player can see the other but each knows the other's initial position. The bombs all have destructive radius R and there is a time lag T between the release of a bomb and the bomb exploding. The searcher gets 1 unit if the hider is destroyed and 0 if he survives. A solution is given for b = 1, and extended to b > 1 when the time lag is small. Various applications of the game are discussed.     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Periodic replacement when minimal repair costs vary with time

A policy of periodic replacement with minimal repair at failure is considered for a complex system. Under such a policy the system is replaced at multiples of some period T while minimal repair is performed at any intervening system failures. The cost of a minimal repair to the system is assumed to be a nonde-creasing function of its age. A simple expression is derived for the expected minimal repair cost in an interval in terms of the cost function and the failure rate of the system. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal replacement interval are exhibited in the case where the system life distribution is strictly increasing failure rate (IFR).     

A sampling procedure and public policy

This paper describes the background of the Office of Management Budget Circular A-21, “Principles for Determining Costs Applicable to Grants, Contracts, and Other Agreements with Educational Institutions,” that describes the requirement for effort reporting. A sampling procedure is proposed as an alternative to 100% reporting.