One more push: Forcing the Dardanelles in March 1915

The historiography of the Gallipoli campaign suggests that the Turks were critically short of ammunition for the Dardanelles coastal defences in March 1915. This theme, established by Winston Churchill, became the basis for a widespread belief that the Royal Navy, after its failure to carry the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915, simply needed one more determined naval push to breakthrough the narrows. The presumed consequence was that the Ottoman Empire, with Constantinople under the guns of the Royal Navy, would have withdrawn from the war. Using modern Turkish sources, the author examines the available quantities, placement, and expenditure of ammunition, and challenges the premise that the Turks were desperately short of heavy shells. The author concludes that the Turks had sufficient remaining ammunition to fiercely contest control of the straits.     

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915

This article examines the Ottoman military's escalatory response to violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical context of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historian's perspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Ottoman Army's 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents on Musa Da? (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that the modern label which most closely approximates what happened there is ethnic cleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Army's counterinsurgency operations.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Reconsidering Truman's claim of ‘half a million American lives’ saved by the atomic bomb: The construction and deconstruction of a myth

This essay, based on substantial archival research, critically examines President Harry S. Truman's often‐cited post‐World War II claim that he had received pre‐Hiroshima counsel in 1945 that the invasion(s) of Japan could cost ‘half a million American lives’. This essay concludes that there is no 1945 archival evidence supporting Truman's postwar contention, and that there is substantial evidence undercutting his claim. Moreover, in view of the total size of American forces scheduled for 1945–46 operations against Japan, any claim of 500,000 American dead seems implausible. This essay also critically examines how Truman's postwar memoir claim of ‘half a million American lives’ was constructed, and this essay discusses the many and rather varied casualty/fatality numbers that Truman presented during his White House and post‐presidential years. Such an analysis also focuses on the numbers he privately provided in the construction of his memoirs by ‘ghost’ writers. Reaching beyond the specific question of Truman's claims, this essay also discusses the dangers of analysts relying heavily upon post‐event memoir and interview sources, and this essay emphasises the need generally to instead privilege contemporaenous archival materials. Otherwise, analysts risk letting policymakers, often in self‐serving recollections, shape the history of crucial events.     

The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.     

Neighborhood search heuristics for selecting hierarchically well‐formulated subsets in polynomial regression

The importance of subset selection in multiple regression has been recognized for more than 40 years and, not surprisingly, a variety of exact and heuristic procedures have been proposed for choosing subsets of variables. In the case of polynomial regression, the subset selection problem is complicated by two issues: (1) the substantial growth in the number of candidate predictors, and (2) the desire to obtain hierarchically well‐formulated subsets that facilitate proper interpretation of the regression parameter estimates. The first of these issues creates the need for heuristic methods that can provide solutions in reasonable computation time; whereas the second requires innovative neighborhood search approaches that accommodate the hierarchical constraints. We developed tabu search and variable neighborhood search heuristics for subset selection in polynomial regression. These heuristics are applied to a classic data set from the literature and, subsequently, evaluated in a simulation study using synthetic data sets. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

An integer decomposition algorithm for solving a two‐stage facility location problem with second‐stage activation costs

We study a stochastic scenario‐based facility location problem arising in situations when facilities must first be located, then activated in a particular scenario before they can be used to satisfy scenario demands. Unlike typical facility location problems, fixed charges arise in the initial location of the facilities, and then in the activation of located facilities. The first‐stage variables in our problem are the traditional binary facility‐location variables, whereas the second‐stage variables involve a mix of binary facility‐activation variables and continuous flow variables. Benders decomposition is not applicable for these problems due to the presence of the second‐stage integer activation variables. Instead, we derive cutting planes tailored to the problem under investigation from recourse solution data. These cutting planes are derived by solving a series of specialized shortest path problems based on a modified residual graph from the recourse solution, and are tighter than the general cuts established by Laporte and Louveaux for two‐stage binary programming problems. We demonstrate the computational efficacy of our approach on a variety of randomly generated test problems. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010