Selection of the optimal setup policy

A model is developed taking into consideration all the costs (namely cost of sampling, cost of not detecting a change in the process, cost of a false indication of change, and the cost of readjusting detected changes) incurred when a production process, using an unscheduled setup policy, utilizes fraction-defective control charts to control current production. The model is based on the concept of the expected time between detection of changes calling for setups. It is shown that the combination of unscheduled setups and control charts can be utilized in an optimal way if those combinations of sample size, sampling interval, and extent of control limits from process average are used that provide the minimum expected total cost per unit of time. The costs of a production process that uses unscheduled setups in conjunction with the appropriate optimal control charts are compared to the costs of a production process that uses scheduled setups at optimum intervals in conjunction with its appropriate control charts. This comparison indicates the criteria for selecting production processes with scheduled setups using optimal setup intervals over unscheduled setups. Suggestions are made to evaluate the optimal process setup strategy and the accompanying optimal decision parameters, for any specific cost data, by use of computer enumeration. A numerical example for assumed cost and process data is provided.     

One- and two-sided sampling plans based on the exponential distribution

In this paper we examine the one- and two-sided sampling plans for the exponential distribution. Solutions are provided for several situations arising out of the assumptions on the knowledge of the parameters of the distribution. The values of the constants are tabled in the special case of p₁ = p₂ for the two-sided plans.     

An exact branch-and-bound procedure for the quadratic-assignment problem

The quadratic-assignment problem is a difficult combinatorial problem which still remains unsolved. In this study, an exact branch-and-bound procedure, which is able to produce optimal solutions for problems with twelve facilities or less, is developed. The method incorporates the concept of stepped fathoming to reduce the effort expended in searching the decision trees. Computational experience with the procedure is presented.     

Stochastic duels with lethal dose

This paper introduces the idea of lethal dose to achieve a kill and examines its effect on the course and final outcome of a duel. Results have been illustrated for a particular case of exponential firing rates.     

De-Constructing the French Wars: Napoleon as Anti-Strategist

The Emperor Napoleon I is regarded as one of the greatest generals of all time and, as such, he has attracted an immense bibliography. In spite of this, there have been few studies of him as a strategist: instead, it is simply assumed that it was enough for the Emperor to have conducted an operation for it to have had a logical strategic goal. In this article, however, Napoleon is shown to have been primarily an opportunist, who was frequently guided by the needs of the moment and swayed from his course by circumstance, while it is further suggested that, even considered on their own merits, many of his decisions were faulty in the extreme.     

France,the United States and the invisible Algerian outcome

The American administration was much influenced through the late 1950s by the consequences of decolonisation. Though a nation historically committed to anti-imperialism, members of the American administration became anxious at the extent to which recently independent states were coalescing into a large ‘neutralist’ bloc likely to threaten US interests, particularly in the UN. Washington feared in particular that this Afro-Asian grouping might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union. How best to solve this problem created divisions within the US government about dealing with the Algerian problem: some favoured closer contacts with the FLN; others wished to help the French. In the end by hedging their bets and wishing to broker a solution American governments displeased both sides.     

Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?

Military units on missions abroad face, among other challenges, terrorism. Terrorists are hard to recognize since they operate non-uniformed. Detection of terrorists in the area of operation can best be done by winning the trust of the local population, who can provide information. However, since the military rotates its units regularly, it is hard to build up a trusting relationship with the local population. Other players in the field of international operations are civil aid organisations. They remain in the area for a lengthy period of time, and often build up trusting relationships with the local population. Trust between civil aid organisations and the military is a triple edged sword, as it enables co-operation: the civil aid organisations get the protection they need from the military, the military gets the information it needs through civil aid organisations and the local population is supported in rebuilding society by repressing terrorism.     

Technical and proliferation‐related aspects of the dismantlement of Russian Alfa‐Class nuclear submarines

When does a state become a “nuclear weapon state”? How we choose to answer this question has significant implications for proliferation assessment, analysis, and policy. Traditionally, the standard demarcation line has been a state's first nuclear test, but in recent years analysts have increasingly focused instead on the accumulation of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material. The article argues that although the test/no-test indicator clearly has problems, its replacement by the SQ/no-SQ indicator would be highly counterproductive. The article instead proposes supplementing the traditional test/no-test indicator with a theory-driven approach that focuses on the incentives and disincentives to test.