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We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012 相似文献
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介绍了CCD高速摄像机基本构成和工作原理,并就其在核爆光辐射信号探测中的应用进行了分析探讨,最后得出使用CCD高速撮像机探测核爆光辐射特性是可行的。 相似文献
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王鸿谷 《国防科技大学学报》1985,(4):81-86
本文讨论了中文信息处理技术发展中的几个问题,特别是关于中文信息处理系统的体系结构方式问题。这些问题是与用户密切相关的。 相似文献
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介绍了数字化装甲营作战仿真实验室的支撑软件组成、结构和功能.军事指挥人员(建模人员)利用支撑软件按照自己的意图,快速制定作战想定,兵力、兵器部署的系统模型,通过系统模型的运行,实现战斗进程的逼真模拟,实施人在环、部分实装在环的装甲兵分队作战指挥对抗演习和实验,完成装甲兵分队的战术和技术训练任务,为装甲兵部队作战理论研究,人员训练,装备作战效能评估,技术保障研究和院校各专业技术人才培养提供高技术的软件平台,并且快速确定系统模型的可信度指标,为上级机关决策的合理化提供有力的支持. 相似文献
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王凌东 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2000,16(2):66-68
本文根据一种玻璃镜的破坏试验结果,结合普通平板玻璃的有关物理性质,对玻璃镜的破坏痕迹进行了实用性的研究。认为玻璃镜的破坏痕迹不仅与造成破坏的原因有关,而且还与破坏时的条件有关。从而为分析火灾现场情况,了解火灾的各种因素提供了理论依据,为尽快查明火灾原因起指导作用。 相似文献
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We consider a stochastic partially observable system that can switch between a normal state and a transient abnormal state before entering a persistent abnormal state. Only the persistent abnormal state requires alarms. The transient and persistent abnormal states may be similar in appearance, which can result in excess false alarms. We propose a partially observable Markov decision process model to minimize the false alarm rate, subject to a given upper bound on the expected alarm delay time. The cost parameter is treated as the Lagrange multiplier, which can be estimated from the bound of the alarm delay. We show that the optimal policy has a control‐limit structure on the probability of persistent abnormality, and derive closed‐form bounds for the control limit and present an algorithm to specify the Lagrange multiplier. We also study a specialized model where the transient and persistent abnormal states have the same observation distribution, in which case an intuitive “watchful‐waiting” policy is optimal. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 320–334, 2016 相似文献
410.
We consider scheduling problems involving two agents (agents A and B), each having a set of jobs that compete for the use of a common machine to process their respective jobs. The due dates of the A‐jobs are decision variables, which are determined by using the common (CON) or slack (SLK) due date assignment methods. Each agent wants to minimize a certain performance criterion depending on the completion times of its jobs only. Under each due date assignment method, the criterion of agent A is always the same, namely an integrated criterion consisting of the due date assignment cost and the weighted number of tardy jobs. Several different criteria are considered for agent B, including the maxima of regular functions (associated with each job), the total (weighted) completion time, and the weighted number of tardy jobs. The overall objective is to minimize the performance criterion of agent A, while keeping the objective value of agent B no greater than a given limit. We analyze the computational complexity, and devise polynomial or pseudo‐polynomial dynamic programming algorithms for the considered problems. We also convert, if viable, any of the devised pseudopolynomial dynamic programming algorithms into a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 416–429, 2016 相似文献