Stochastic analysis of a single server retrial queue with general retrial times

Retrial queueing systems are widely used in teletraffic theory and computer and communication networks. Although there has been a rapid growth in the literature on retrial queueing systems, the research on retrial queues with nonexponential retrial times is very limited. This paper is concerned with the analytical treatment of an M/G/1 retrial queue with general retrial times. Our queueing model is different from most single server retrial queueing models in several respectives. First, customers who find the server busy are queued in the orbit in accordance with an FCFS (first‐come‐first‐served) discipline and only the customer at the head of the queue is allowed for access to the server. Besides, a retrial time begins (if applicable) only when the server completes a service rather upon a service attempt failure. We carry out an extensive analysis of the queue, including a necessary and sufficient condition for the system to be stable, the steady state distribution of the server state and the orbit length, the waiting time distribution, the busy period, and other related quantities. Finally, we study the joint distribution of the server state and the orbit length in non‐stationary regime. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 561–581, 1999     

低碳钢中硫化物夹杂物诱发点蚀的机理

选择两种具有典型硫化物夹杂物的碳钢,通过显微腐蚀试验、浸泡试验及带有显微跟踪观察的极化试验考察了点蚀发生的初始过程,结合金相和扫描电镜电子探针分析,提出了碳钢中硫化物夹杂物诱发点蚀的机理。     

用闪光摄影法对轴针式喷嘴喷雾的研究及其数学模型修正

利用自行设计的静态高压模拟燃烧室,采用闪光摄影技术,对12V180CaD—2柴油机轴针式喷油器的喷雾发展进行了实验研究,并根据实验结果对轴针式喷油器喷雾贯穿长度的计算公式进行了校核和修正。     

Guns for Butter? Empirical Evidence from China

Abstract

This study examines the causal nexus between defence spending and education expenditure in China using the bootstrap Granger full-sample causality test and sub-sample rolling window estimation. The full-sample result indicates that there is no causality between defence spending and education expenditure. By adopting a time-varying rolling window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationships, this article identifies a negative unidirectional causality running from education expenditure to defence spending. The finding suggests that it is the education expenditure crowds out defence spending in China rather than reverse. No causality is demonstrated from defence spending to education expenditure, indicating that an increase in military spending will not crowd out expenditure on education. The results could be partly explained by that the education expenditure in China is below the requirement of corresponding economic growth, urging for more financial budget. Whereas the findings support a negative trade-off between defence and education expenditures, they refute the theory of ‘guns for butter’.     

Export controls,market structure and international coordination

We look at the different ways of aggregating the exports of dual use products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure and competition between exporting firms in determining the existence of multiple equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting export controls.     

THE LONG‐RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GDP IN TAIWAN

Using the Solow–Swan growth model and the time‐trend included in the aggregate production function, this study applies the multivariate cointegration approach to re‐investigate the long‐run and causal relationships between defence expenditures and GDP while controlling for capital and labour input in Taiwan during the 1955–2002 period. It examines the long‐run causal relationship using the weak exogeneity test and utilizes general impulse response functions to determine whether a shock to defence expenditures affects economic growth or vice versa. Our findings provide substantive evidence in favour of the existence of a long‐run equilibrium cointegrated relationship between defence expenditures, GDP, labour and capital stock. The results of the weak exogeneity test indicate that a bi‐directional causal relationship exists in the long‐run between defence expenditures and GDP. Thus, the main policy implication that emerges from the long‐run results is that increasing defence expenditures in Taiwan is an effective means to boost overall economic performance and, with this improved economy, it should then be able to increase its defence expenditures further. Lastly, from our dynamic vector error correction model estimations, it is found that defence expenditures are a major means of adjusting for disequilibria that occur within the system.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.