基于OBDD的防空导弹系统效能评估研究

首先对OBDD的概念和操作运算进行了简要介绍;接着对ADC系统效能模型进行了分析,首次提出了应用shannon展开和ite操作进行效能模型可用性和可信性向量计算的方法;最后应用OBDD操作运算对典型防空导弹系统进行了分析,并以可用性向量计算为例说明了应用OBDD的具体方法.该方法适用于各种故障分布情况下防空导弹系统效能的评估,具有一定的军事应用价值.     

关于校准实验室使用校准方法问题的探讨

本文探讨了校准实验室在使用校准方法中常出现的几个问题,以及在实际工作中如何采取措施以保证所使用的方法满足ISO/IEC 17025的相关要求。     

改进粒子群算法在导弹火力分配中的应用

粒子群优化算法是一种新兴的优化技术,思想来源于人工生命和演化计算理论.由于该算法简单易实现,可调参数少,目前已得到广泛研究和应用.在建立导弹武器火力分配数学模型的基础上,运用改进粒子群算法对模型进行了最优化求解,实例的计算结果表明该优化算法对于模型的求解具有较好的收敛性.     

Combining standardized time series area and Cramér–von Mises variance estimators

We propose three related estimators for the variance parameter arising from a steady‐state simulation process. All are based on combinations of standardized‐time‐series area and Cramér–von Mises (CvM) estimators. The first is a straightforward linear combination of the area and CvM estimators; the second resembles a Durbin–Watson statistic; and the third is related to a jackknifed version of the first. The main derivations yield analytical expressions for the bias and variance of the new estimators. These results show that the new estimators often perform better than the pure area, pure CvM, and benchmark nonoverlapping and overlapping batch means estimators, especially in terms of variance and mean squared error. We also give exact and Monte Carlo examples illustrating our findings.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

完善舰船装备维修体制 提高预防性维修水平

分析了海军装备目前的维修现状以及存在的问题,论述了实行视情维修的重要性和必要性,提出了建立以视情维修为主的预防性维修大纲的原则．     

军械仓库的物资发放研究

用仿真模型研究了仓库物资的发放过程,定量解决了如何科学合理地分配一条作业线中作业机械的使用问题。根据这一结果,研究了在给定作业量的情况下如何确定作业机械数量的方法。     

磁悬浮隔振系统的行为与分析

磁悬浮隔振是一种新型的主动式隔振技术。文中首先对磁悬浮隔振系统做一般性的说明,然后以自行研制的磁悬浮隔振试验装置为对象,分析了磁悬浮隔振的机理和特性;论述了磁悬浮隔振系统的建模和控制策略;最后对磁悬浮隔振系统运行与特性进行分析并给出了分析结果和仿真结果的比较。     

Retailer's rationale to refuse consumer returns in supply chains

While accepting consumer returns has long been proposed as a solution to resolve the consumer valuation uncertainty problem, there are still a sizable portion of retailers who insist on a “no return” policy. In this article, we offer an economic rationale for these seemingly unreasonable strategies in a supply chain context. We demonstrate when and why the retailer may benefit from refusing consumer returns, even though offering consumer returns allows the supply chain to implement the expostmarket segmentation. Granting the retailer the right to refuse consumer returns may sometimes improve supply chain efficiency: it eliminates the manufacturer's attempt to induce inefficient consumer returns and bring the equilibrium back to that in the vertically integrated benchmark. We also find that the refund and the retail price can move in the opposite directions when product reliability varies, and consumer returns have a nontrivial impact on the quality choice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 686–701, 2015     

Impact of reseller's and sales agent's forecasting accuracy in a multilayer supply chain

We consider a three‐layer supply chain with a manufacturer, a reseller, and a sales agent. The demand is stochastically determined by the random market condition and the sales agent's private effort level. Although the manufacturer is uninformed about the market condition, the reseller and the sales agent conduct demand forecasting and generate private demand signals. Under this framework with two levels of adverse selection intertwined with moral hazard, we study the impact of the reseller's and the sales agent's forecasting accuracy on the profitability of each member. We show that the manufacturer's profitability is convex on the reseller's forecasting accuracy. From the manufacturer's perspective, typically improving the reseller's accuracy is detrimental when the accuracy is low but is beneficial when it is high. We identify the concrete interrelation among the manufacturer‐optimal reseller's accuracy, the volatility of the market condition, and the sales agent's accuracy. Finally, the manufacturer's interest may be aligned with the reseller's when only the reseller can choose her accuracy; this alignment is never possible when both downstream players have the discretion to choose their accuracy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 207–222, 2014     

Return policy: Hassle‐free or your money‐back guarantee?

This article compares the profitability of two pervasively adopted return policies—money‐back guarantee and hassle‐free policies. In our model, a seller sells to consumers with heterogeneous valuations and hassle costs. Products are subject to quality risk, and product misfit can only be observed post‐purchase. While the hassle‐free policy is cost advantageous from the seller's viewpoint, a money‐back guarantee allows the seller to fine‐tune the consumer hassle on returning the product. Thus, when the two return policies lead to the same consumer behaviors, the hassle‐free policy dominates. Conversely, a money‐back guarantee can be more profitable even if on average, high‐valuation consumers experience a lower hassle cost than the low‐valuation ones. The optimal hassle cost can be higher when product quality gets improved; thus, it is not necessarily a perfect proxy or signal of the seller's quality. We further allow the seller to adopt a mixture of these policies, and identify the concrete operating regimes within which these return policies are optimal among more flexible policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 403–417, 2014