JUST WAR AND CYBERWAR

My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar.     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

Book reviews

Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. By Honore M. Catudal. Mansell, London (1988), ISBN 0–7201–2000–4, £25.00

The Military: More Than Just a Job? Edited by Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood. Pergamon‐Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–034321‐X, £17.00 ($30.00)

Douglas Haig, 1861–1928. By Gerard J. de Groot. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), ISBN 004 4401922, £20.00

Defence Policy Making. A Comparative Analysis. Edited by G. M. Dillon. Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0–715–1268–5, £10.95

The Future of U.K. Air Power. Edited by P. Sabin. Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–035825‐X (hardcover), 0–08–036256–7 (flexicover), hardcover £18.95 ($34.00), flexicover £9.95 ($17.95)     

Book reviews

Military Strategy in a Changing Europe: Towards the Twenty‐first Century.. Edited by Brian Holden Reid and Michael Dewar. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–037706–8 £27.50 (US$49.95)

On Future War. By Martin van Creveld. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–04179–65 £22.50 (US$38.25)

American and Soviet Intervention: Effects on World Stability. Edited by Karen A. Feste. Taylor and Francis, New York (1990), ISBN 0–8448–1632–9. £40.00

Soziale Deutungsmuster von Bataillonskommandeuren der Bundeswehr: Ein Beitrag zum beruflichen Selbstverstandnis einer militarischen Elite. By Georg‐Maria Meyer. Deutscher Universitätsverlag (1992)

The Laser in America: 1950–1970. By Joan Lisa Bromberg. MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1991), ISBN 0–262–02318–0, £26.95     

Book reviews

Small Wars Manual. United States Marine Corps 1940, with introduction by Ronald Schaffer, Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, Kansas, (1990), ISBN: 0-89745-112-0.

Military Mindlessness: an Informal Compendium. Edited by Raymond Horricks. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, (1993), ISBN: 1-56000-105-4. Price $26.95

Sipri Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1993) ISBN 0-19-829166-3 - Price £50.00

Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy. By Julius O. Ihonvbere. Transaction Publishers, London & New Brunswick (1994), ISBN 1-56000-093-7, Price £34.95     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.