JUST WAR AND CYBERWAR

My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar.     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

Book reviews

Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. By Honore M. Catudal. Mansell, London (1988), ISBN 0–7201–2000–4, £25.00

The Military: More Than Just a Job? Edited by Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood. Pergamon‐Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–034321‐X, £17.00 ($30.00)

Douglas Haig, 1861–1928. By Gerard J. de Groot. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), ISBN 004 4401922, £20.00

Defence Policy Making. A Comparative Analysis. Edited by G. M. Dillon. Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0–715–1268–5, £10.95

The Future of U.K. Air Power. Edited by P. Sabin. Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–035825‐X (hardcover), 0–08–036256–7 (flexicover), hardcover £18.95 ($34.00), flexicover £9.95 ($17.95)     

Book reviews

Military Strategy in a Changing Europe: Towards the Twenty‐first Century.. Edited by Brian Holden Reid and Michael Dewar. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–037706–8 £27.50 (US$49.95)

On Future War. By Martin van Creveld. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–04179–65 £22.50 (US$38.25)

American and Soviet Intervention: Effects on World Stability. Edited by Karen A. Feste. Taylor and Francis, New York (1990), ISBN 0–8448–1632–9. £40.00

Soziale Deutungsmuster von Bataillonskommandeuren der Bundeswehr: Ein Beitrag zum beruflichen Selbstverstandnis einer militarischen Elite. By Georg‐Maria Meyer. Deutscher Universitätsverlag (1992)

The Laser in America: 1950–1970. By Joan Lisa Bromberg. MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1991), ISBN 0–262–02318–0, £26.95     

Book reviews

Small Wars Manual. United States Marine Corps 1940, with introduction by Ronald Schaffer, Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, Kansas, (1990), ISBN: 0-89745-112-0.

Military Mindlessness: an Informal Compendium. Edited by Raymond Horricks. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, (1993), ISBN: 1-56000-105-4. Price $26.95

Sipri Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1993) ISBN 0-19-829166-3 - Price £50.00

Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy. By Julius O. Ihonvbere. Transaction Publishers, London & New Brunswick (1994), ISBN 1-56000-093-7, Price £34.95     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace

In this paper, I critically analyse the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), as it relates to the responsibility of intervening forces towards the people they claim to protect and the challenges that the situation in Libya now poses in the region and for the African Union (AU). I focus most of my attention on the coercive elements of the RtoP framework (Pillar III). This is the most contested element in the framework. Three questions guide this article: were there legitimate grounds to justify an external intervention in Libya? In the words of Hugh Roberts in Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go, ‘[w]hat if anything has Libya got in exchange for all the death and destruction that have been visited on it’ since 2011? What are the practical implications and consequences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, led by the United States (US), for regional peace? I discuss the problems surrounding the US–NATO intervention, followed by an analysis of the various positions and narratives leading up to the intervention, the framing and justifications provided for the intervention, and an analysis of the AU's proposal for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. I analyse the various debates that took place in the US (Pentagon/White House), at the United Nations, among scholars in the West and in Africa, and among various actors who tried to broker a ceasefire in Libya before and during the intervention. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for regional peace.