Bayesian inference for a Lanchester type combat model

We undertake inference for a stochastic form of the Lanchester combat model. In particular, given battle data, we assess the type of battle that occurred and whether or not it makes any difference to the number of casualties if an army is attacking or defending. Our approach is Bayesian and we use modern computational techniques to fit the model. We illustrate our method using data from the Ardennes campaign. We compare our results with previous analyses of these data by Bracken and Fricker. Our conclusions are somewhat different to those of Bracken. Where he suggests that a linear law is appropriate, we show that the logarithmic or linear‐logarithmic laws fit better. We note however that the basic Lanchester modeling assumptions do not hold for the Ardennes data. Using Fricker's modified data, we show that although his “super‐logarithmic” law fits best, the linear, linear‐logarithmic, and logarithmic laws cannot be ruled out. We suggest that Bayesian methods can be used to make inference for battles in progress. We point out a number of advantages: Prior information from experts or previous battles can be incorporated; predictions of future casualties are easily made; more complex models can be analysed using stochastic simulation techniques. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 541–558, 2000     

Exploiting self‐canceling demand point aggregation error for some planar rectilinear median location problems

When solving location problems in practice it is quite common to aggregate demand points into centroids. Solving a location problem with aggregated demand data is computationally easier, but the aggregation process introduces error. We develop theory and algorithms for certain types of centroid aggregations for rectilinear 1‐median problems. The objective is to construct an aggregation that minimizes the maximum aggregation error. We focus on row‐column aggregations, and make use of aggregation results for 1‐median problems on the line to do aggregation for 1‐median problems in the plane. The aggregations developed for the 1‐median problem are then used to construct approximate n‐median problems. We test the theory computationally on n‐median problems (n ≥ 1) using both randomly generated, as well as real, data. Every error measure we consider can be well approximated by some power function in the number of aggregate demand points. Each such function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 614–637, 2003.     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.     

The Clausewitzian fallacy of absolute war

Clausewitz was much preoccupied with the apparent contradiction between real and absolute war. Why did war in history so rarely exhibit the extremes of violence and energy implied in the pure concept of war? Clausewitz’s commentators have usually followed him in thinking that this was a genuine problem in need of a solution, but I want to question that view. I will argue that Clausewitz did not have a coherent philosophy of absolute war, and therefore the contradiction he posited between real and absolute war was equally meaningless – as, too, was his effort to resolve it by claiming that some real wars approached or even attained the absolute form of war. The real problem was not the opposition of real and absolute war, but the self-contradictory theory of absolute war.     

An Investigation of the Weights of Pattern 1907 Bayonets made in the UK around the First World War Period

The standard issue bayonet of the British Army immediately preceding and during the First World War was the Pattern 1907. This was manufactured at different times and in varying numbers during that period by one official body, the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, and by five private contractors. These bayonets were made according to published official specifications issued by the War Department and based on a ‘pattern example’ provided by the Royal Small Arms Factory. The specifications indicate, inter alia, the quality of metal used in making the bayonets, methods of inspection and proofing, and the required maximum and minimum weight range of the completed bayonet. However, examination of a series of these bayonets in a private collection suggested that their weights varied considerably from the mid-point values of the allowed weight ranges in the original and amended specifications (16.5 oz. and 17 oz., respectively). To establish if this was a common feature among this class of bayonet as opposed to a chance factor, the weights of other surviving Pattern 1907 bayonets were determined and compared to establish the degree of variance from the official specifications as originally set out by the Royal Small Arms Factory. Seventy-six percent of the 142 bayonets surveyed were found to be above the mid-point of the allowed weight range given in the amended manufacturing specifications, with many being at the upper end of the allowed range. This is a statistically unusual result. It is speculated that the target weight may have been deliberately set higher by the individual manufacturers to eliminate the possibility of rejection of any underweight bayonets by the Royal Small Arms Factory inspectors and so a refusal of acceptance and payment for the work.     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

EXAMINING ISRAEL'S NPT EXCEPTIONALITY: 1998–2005

Israel's exceptional status as a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been an increasingly salient issue, particularly during the intense debate over universality in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and again following the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998. This analysis argues that despite these events, Israel's diplomatic position has not weakened significantly in the past decade. The factors that have led to this outcome include changes in the political and strategic environment, including the Iraqi and Iranian NPT violations, and Israeli engagement in different fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations, and in bilateral strategic dialogues with key powers. This report examines whether Israel's exceptional status is likely to be maintained in the face of recent developments in Iran and the precedent set by the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.