Minimax trees,paths, and cut sets

The notions of minimax paths, trees, and cut sets are defined for undirected graphs; and relationships between these entities are established. Simple solution procedures based on these relationships are presented.     

Toward a study of bidding processes part IV - games with unknown costs

This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1-.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric.     

A tactical warfare simulation program

The Tactical Warfare Simulation Program is a procedure by which the major interactions among opposing military units and terrain features can be treated in a tactical limited warfare situation. It is a critical-area, sequence-of-event model and is programmed in SIM-SCRIPT. In this program a military unit is described by such properties as strength, size, location, velocity, and attrition rates. Some of the events which can occur to a military unit are entering/leaving terrain features, becoming engaged/disengaged with opposing units, retreating, reaching an objective, and breaking. Following a discussion of the general features of the program, a study of a hypothetical war is presented.     

Landmarks in defense literature

The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis By M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer Boston: Harvard University Press, (1962).     

Book reviews

Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq. by Davina Miller, London: Cassell, 1996, ISBN 0-304-33852-4 (hbk), £40.00, 04-33853-2 (pbk), £11.99.

The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-1941. by Trevor Allen, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7165-2616-6, (hbk) £17.50.

Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Greqory J. Rattray (eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

Asia-Pacific Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities. Edited by Gary Klintworth. Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, ISBN 0-582-80321-7, £24.99.

Masters of War, Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. by Robert Buzzanco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-521-48046-9 (hbk), £29.95

Controlling the Arms Trade: the West Versus the Rest. By Paul Cornish, London: Bowerdean Publishing Co., 1996, ISBN 0-906097-44-4 (pbk), £9.99.

Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World. by Loch K. Johnson, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-300-06611-2 (hbk), £22.50.     

Economic impact and the notion of compensated procurement

The paper consists essentially of two parts. In the first part a linear economic impact model is presented whose structure is based on subcontracting flows. The structural coefficients are defined in terms of flows per area. The model is derived from two identities that are analogous to the income and expenditure identities of national income accounting. The parameters are prime contracts and when one or several of the prime contracts are changed, the model determines the impacts of such changes on the various regions that have been selected. The impacts can be combined with regional multipliers to derive changes in regional income and regional employment. Fragmentary data for this kind of model have been collected on a one-time basis by DOD in 1965 and some results based on the data are presented. The second part of the paper is concerned with normative economics. A scheme is suggested, called compensated procurement, that outlines how the Department of Defense might employ the impact model in a macroeconomic setting. The basic idea is that a stabilization fund be established to finance an array of potential projects which are contracted for to balance sudden shifts in defense demand. Only short-run stabilization is advocated.     

Minimizing costs of sequential and parallel personnel testing programs

We consider groups of tests for personnel selection purposes in which each test has a known a priori probability of being failed, such failure resulting in outright rejection and termination of testing. Each test has a fixed cost and given duration. We consider the minimization of the total expected cost due to both the fixed costs and the delay costs when the tests may be conducted sequentially or in parallel. In the latter situation, a heuristic algorithm is proposed and illustrated.     

British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept

At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, the UK and Germany unveiled two new initiatives for European defence cooperation, known, respectively, as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Both were the result of economic pressures and the need to exercise intra-alliance leadership, but they represented very different approaches to cooperation. The JEF was to be a UK-led contingency force for short-notice operations, selectively incorporating forces from allies and partners. The FNC sought to coordinate capability development between groups of allies, centred on larger framework nations, to develop coherent capability-clusters available to meet NATO’s force requirements. The common denominator and novelty of the initiatives was the building of forces and capabilities multinationally by having major states act as framework nations for groups of smaller allies. The UK and Germany have ownership and continue to provide leadership to these initiatives. This is one key reason why they continue to evolve to accommodate changing circumstances and are likely to endure.     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.