通用对潜搜索作战模型效能计算方法

对潜搜索模型有很多种,并且这些搜索模型可能因为进一部的完善、优化而发生改变;根据装备的发展及部队作战、训练的需要,也可能有新的模型不断加入.这些模型的作战效果指标是决定其是否可用的重要依据之一,而作战效果的计算应基于统一的方法,而不能各自不同,这样,得出的结论才具有可比性.为了实现这个目的,建立了基于蒙特卡罗法的通用计...     

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

The RAF staff college and the evolution of British strategic bombing policy, 1922–1929

This article borrows from the work of Clausewitz to posit two general approaches to the pursuit of limitation in war, one being political and the other technical. The political approach seeks to control escalation via consensual arrangements with the adversary, while the technical approach seeks to forestall escalation by peremptorily destroying the enemy's military capability. It is argued that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) instantiates the second, technical, approach to war limitation. By exploiting advanced technology, the US armed forces hope to limit the costs of war by defeating their adversaries in a rapid, decisive manner. The problems associated with this approach are discussed in relation to the nature of the conflicts that the US is likely to face in the foreseeable future. The article concludes by suggesting that such conflicts will require that more attention be paid to the political sources of limitation in war.     

The New Constabularies: Planning US Military Stabilization Missions

Modern peace enforcement missions are much more akin to historical constabulary missions than they are to traditional peace operations. As such, the underlying strategic and operational bases for these missions are both more complex and have more elements that can go wrong than does classic peacekeeping. At the operational level, such issues as relations with civilian organizations, coordination with other nations' forces, and command and control of highly disparate elements become critical. The area in which the most significant problems have occurred, however, has been in translating political goals into a realistic military strategy.