Algorithm to solve a chance‐constrained network capacity design problem with stochastic demands and finite support

We consider the problem of determining the capacity to assign to each arc in a given network, subject to uncertainty in the supply and/or demand of each node. This design problem underlies many real‐world applications, such as the design of power transmission and telecommunications networks. We first consider the case where a set of supply/demand scenarios are provided, and we must determine the minimum‐cost set of arc capacities such that a feasible flow exists for each scenario. We briefly review existing theoretical approaches to solving this problem and explore implementation strategies to reduce run times. With this as a foundation, our primary focus is on a chance‐constrained version of the problem in which α% of the scenarios must be feasible under the chosen capacity, where α is a user‐defined parameter and the specific scenarios to be satisfied are not predetermined. We describe an algorithm which utilizes a separation routine for identifying violated cut‐sets which can solve the problem to optimality, and we present computational results. We also present a novel greedy algorithm, our primary contribution, which can be used to solve for a high quality heuristic solution. We present computational analysis to evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 236–246, 2016     

Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan

Decades of scholarship have warned against using historical analogies for policymaking. But the Taliban insurgency appears, on the surface, to confirm the usefulness of historical analogies to the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan. I review the use of analogies for the war in Afghanistan and argue the analogies were historically unsound and strategically unhelpful. In fact, their effect on policy helped create the conditions for the very insurgency policymakers most hoped to avoid. The Taliban insurgency did not occur because of the presence of too many foreign troops and aid workers, but because there were too few.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

Optimal weapons allocation against layered defenses

We solve the problem of optimal allocation of weapons to targets in the presence of layered regional defenses. The general solution technique is an integer program transformable to a minimum-cost network flow. This model assumes the defense has perfect weapons. Results of a small sample scenario are included. Additionally, a representative attrition algorithm is described and the two models combined to form a hybrid algorithm. The hybrid algorithm allows for less-than-perfect weapons while maintaining optimality.     

Asymptotically optimal component assembly plans in repairable systems and server allocation in parallel multiserver queues

T identical exponential lifetime components out of which G are initially functioning (and B are not) are to be allocated to N subsystems, which are connected either in parallel or in series. Subsystem i, i = 1,…, N, functions when at least K_i of its components function and the whole system is maintained by a single repairman. Component repair times are identical independent exponentials and repaired components are as good as new. The problem of the determination of the assembly plan that will maximize the system reliability at any (arbitrary) time instant t is solved when the component failure rate is sufficiently small. For the parallel configuration, the optimal assembly plan allocates as many components as possible to the subsystem with the smallest K_i and allocates functioning components to subsystems in increasing order of the K_i's. For the series configuration, the optimal assembly plan allocates both the surplus and the functioning components equally to all subsystems whenever possible, and when not possible it favors subsystems in decreasing order of the K_i's. The solution is interpreted in the context of the optimal allocation of processors and an initial number of jobs in a problem of routing time consuming jobs to parallel multiprocessor queues. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 732–746, 2001     

Scheduling customer arrivals to a stochastic service system

An efficient algorithm for determining the optimal arrival schedule for customers in a stochastic service system is developed. All customers arrive exactly when scheduled, and service times are modeled as iid Erlang random variables. Costs are incurred at a fixed rate per unit of time each customer waits for service, and an additional cost is incurred for every unit of time the server operates beyond a scheduled closing time. The objective is to minimize total operating cost. This type of problem arises in many operational contexts including transportation, manufacturing, and appointment‐based services. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 549–559, 1999     

The open shop scheduling problem with a given sequence of jobs on one machine

The paper considers the open shop scheduling problem to minimize the make-span, provided that one of the machines has to process the jobs according to a given sequence. We show that in the preemptive case the problem is polynomially solvable for an arbitrary number of machines. If preemption is not allowed, the problem is NP-hard in the strong sense if the number of machines is variable, and is NP-hard in the ordinary sense in the case of two machines. For the latter case we give a heuristic algorithm that runs in linear time and produces a schedule with the makespan that is at most 5/4 times the optimal value. We also show that the two-machine problem in the nonpreemptive case is solvable in pseudopolynomial time by a dynamic programming algorithm, and that the algorithm can be converted into a fully polynomial approximation scheme. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 705–731, 1998     

Other side of the Iranian coin: Iran’s counterterrorism apparatus

Iran’s support for terrorist groups is the subject of countless articles and monographs. Less emphasis is placed on Tehran’s efforts to fight terrorist groups targeting the Iranian state. Yet, modern domestic and foreign terrorist groups have targeted Iran for decades. As a result, the country has developed fairly sophisticated, albeit opaque, counterterrorism apparatus and mechanisms. This article sheds light on the Iranian counterterrorism apparatus and efforts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, drawing on several years of fieldwork in Iran, interviews with current and former officials, and Persian sources.     

Forces of heresy versus forces of conservation: making sense of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan’s and the Taleban’s positions in the Afghan insurgency

Ethnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate that the social structure of the Taleban renders them prone to ‘heresy’, while the formerly second biggest insurgent group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party, has rather been an impeded force of ‘conservation.’