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561.
Ndubuisi N. Nwokolo 《African Security Review》2020,29(1):41-57
ABSTRACT There is a great conviction that the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 2002 on the Bakassi boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and Nigeria’s decision to obey the ruling may have stopped a fierce inter-state war over the boundary. Indeed, many then ascribed to the whole boundary demarcation process as peacebuilding, disregarding the structural changes marked by the violence of forced migration. This article explores how the boundary delimitation has produced particular sorts of structural violence characterised by state neglect, loss of livelihoods and destitution. Thus, the article argues that although a full-blown war was avoided, the socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian populations on both sides of the border were not adequately considered and guaranteed as part of the peace-building agenda. It further argues that Nigeria, like many post-colonial states with the concentration of developments in major cities, neglects rural and border communities. Thus, the border communities accommodating the former Bakassi residents have further degenerated into ‘ill-governed’ spaces. This article uses structural violence as a framework to analyse the primary and secondary data to provide some deeper insights into the issues of violence being experienced by the local populations living on both sides of the demarcated border. 相似文献
562.
In this article, we are concerned with scheduling stochastic jobs in a flowshop with m machines and zero intermediate storage. We assume that there are n - 2 identically distributed and 2 fast stochastic jobs. Roughly, the main result states that the makespan is stochastically minimized by placing one of the fast jobs first and the other last. 相似文献
563.
ABSTRACTNovichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly. 相似文献
564.
Matthew P. Dearing 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):101-139
ABSTRACTThe American way of war in Afghanistan presents a conundrum for proponents of 21st-century state-building projects. How can liberal peace proponents engage in efficient state building without sacrificing their ideals? The US learned that state-building allocates a degree of command and control to powerbrokers operating in the shadows to launder aid money, traffic illicit narcotics, and engage in extrajudicial punishments. These clients failed to represent the liberal values foreign patrons endorsed, because the latter not only offered resources without conditions but also rewarded bad behavior. This issue is examined by looking at the case of post-2001 northern Afghanistan, where powerful warlords should have held greater control over their paramilitary forces, limited predatory behavior, and built stronger relationships with the community. Instead, warlords-turned-statesmen expanded their material and social influence in the north, while holding onto the informal instruments of racketeering and patronage that overwhelmed Western ideals and shaped the predatory state present in Afghanistan today. Moreover, paramilitaries were influenced by material, social, and normative incentives that rewarded violent and predatory behavior and further eroded already weak community control mechanisms at the subdistrict level. 相似文献
565.
566.
David P. Oakley 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):62-80
ABSTRACTDespite its portrayal as something new, the concept of the ‘gray zone’ is not novel. It was the Cold War battleground in which the USA and the Soviet Union waged rival unconventional campaigns, and it was there that the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given responsibility for operating. This was not the organization’s original purpose, but Cold War exigencies forced Washington to improvise and build an organization with unique capabilities. These early years shaped the CIA’s operations directorate, creating two distinct cultures within the larger agency, one focused on intelligence collection and the other focused on covert action. 相似文献
567.
Colin D. Robinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):109-122
ABSTRACTGrouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command. 相似文献
568.
569.
Colin D. Robinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2019,35(4):423-429
ABSTRACTBagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham correctly argue that the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official security institutions in Africa have been somewhat neglected, with a lack of much recent research. The Somali National Army (SNA) sits among these lacunae. Its formal structures can be used as a skeletal starting point and springboard to start to draw the network diagrams that chart informal linkages. This is why recent declassification decisions by U.S. intelligence bodies, coupled with period documents released to the UK National Archives, hold significance in helping us understand early hierarchical SNA arrangements. They show the steady build-up in size of the force, to 1987, to about the time the civil war began to fragment the state. 相似文献
570.
Gregory D. Koblentz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):575-598
ABSTRACTInternational efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished. 相似文献