The effects of model parameter deviations on the variance of a linearly filtered time series

We consider a general linear filtering operation on an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) time series. The variance of the filter output, which is an important quantity in many applications, is not known with certainty because it depends on the true ARMA parameters. We derive an expression for the sensitivity (i.e., the partial derivative) of the output variance with respect to deviations in the model parameters. The results provide insight into the robustness of many common statistical methods that are based on linear filtering and also yield approximate confidence intervals for the output variance. We discuss applications to time series forecasting, statistical process control, and automatic feedback control of industrial processes. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

An evolving state of play? Exploring competitive advantages of state assets in proliferation networks

Illicit procurement networks often target industry in developed economies to acquire materials and components of use in WMD and military programs. These procurement networks are ultimately directed by elements of the proliferating state and utilize state resources to undertake their activities: diplomats and missions, state intelligence networks, and state-connected logistical assets. These state assets have also been utilized to facilitate the export of WMD and military technologies in breach of sanctions. While used in most historic proliferation cases, their role has seen limited consideration in the scholarly literature. This article seeks to systematically contextualize state resources in proliferation networks, arguing that their use lies between state criminality and routine activity in support of national security. Considering the competitive advantages of these assets compared to similar resources available in the private sector, the article argues that nonproliferation efforts have caused states to change how they use these resources through an ongoing process of competitive adaptation.     

An (s,S) inventory system with rest periods to the server

We study the (s,S) inventory system in which the server takes a rest when the level of the inventory is zero. The demands are assumed to occur for one unit at a time. The interoccurrence times between successive demands, the lead times, and the rest times are assumed to follow general distributions which are mutually independent. Using renewal and convolution techniques we obtain the state transition probabilities.     

Return policies for an inventory system with positive and negative demands

We consider a single item inventory system with positive and negative stock fluctuations. Items can be purchased from a central stock, n items can be returned for a cost R + rn, and a linear inventory carrying cost is charged. It is shown that for minimizing the asymptotic cost rate when returns are a significant fraction of stock usage, a two-critical-number policy (a,b) is optimal, where b is the trigger level for returns and b – a is the return quantity. The values for a and b are found, as well as the operating characteristics of the system. We also consider the optimal return decision to make at time zero and show that it is partially determined by a and b.     

A two-echelon inventory model with purchases,dispositions, shipments,returns and transshipments

This paper presents a one-period two-echelon inventory model with one warehouse in the first echelon and n warehouses in the second echelon. At the beginning of the period the stock levels at all facilities are adjusted by purchasing or disposing of items at the first echelon, returning or shipping items between the echelons and transshipping items within the second echelon. During the period, demands (which may be negative) are placed on all warehouses in the second echelon and an attempt is made to satisfy shortages either by an expedited shipment from the first echelon to the second echelon or an expedited transshipment within the second echelon. The decision problem is to choose an initial stock level at the first echelon (by a purchase or a disposition) and an initial allocation so as to minimize the initial stock movement costs during the period plus inventory carrying costs and system shortage costs at the end of the period. It is shown that the objective function takes on one of four forms, depending on the relative magnitudes of the various shipping costs. All four forms of the objective function are derived and proven to be convex. Several applications of this general model are considered. We also consider multi-period extensions of the general model and an important special case is solved explicitly.     

Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth

We use the Hsiao–Granger method to test for terrorism–growth causality for seven Western European countries. In bivariate settings, the impact of economic performance on domestic terrorism is very strong. In trivariate settings, the impact of performance on terrorism diminishes. In general, we find that economic performance leads terrorist violence in robust ways only for three out of seven countries. Terrorism is almost never found to causally influence growth in bivariate and trivariate specifications. Our findings indicate that the role of economic performance in determining terrorist violence appears to have been important for some countries, whereas all attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to the threat of terrorism.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.