Toward optimal bidding strategies

In this paper we investigate a form of rational behavior in response to an oligopoly pricing problem where only one buyer is involved. We investigate the problem from the standpoint of the seller who wants to maximize his gain from the transaction. In particular, we deal with the problem of one seller's response to an invitation to submit a sealed (i. e., noncooperative) bid to a government or other dominant purchasing agency for supplying a specified bundle of goods and services for which either (1) no other demand exists, or (2) the terms or quantities involved cannot, at least in the short run, be obtained from another source. Although treated from a normative standpoint, i. e., what bid the supplier should make, the paper also has implications for the buyer's behavior and oligopoly-monopsony pricing in a more general sense.     

On the minimization of a certain convex function arising in applied decision theory

The author, in an expository paper [4], has presented an algorithm for choosing a non-negative vector

     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Critics gone wild: Counterinsurgency as the root of all evil

The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency – the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns have been bloody, violent, and protracted. Yet as this review highlights, beyond these central points, criticism of counterinsurgency is too often off the mark in its approach and totalizing in its pretentions. There is much to criticize and an urgent need to learn from past campaigns, yet bold claims and broad generalizations can mislead rather than enlighten. The analysis is particularly unhelpful when the definition of the central issue at hand – counterinsurgency – is being unwittingly or deliberately distorted. In the end, these two books form a poor basis for the debate that must now take place, because they are too ideological in tone, too undisciplined in approach, and therefore too unqualified in what they finally say.     

Life cycle costs for decision support ‐ a study of the various life cycle costs used at different levels of defence policy and management∗

Debates on many aspects of defence economics ‐ on the scale of defence expenditure, on the allocation of that expenditure to various military capabilities, and on the selection of equipment offering the best value for money ‐ are bedevilled by misunderstandings and misconceptions about the costs of defence equipment. This paper seeks to improve understanding of defence equipment costs by defining a hierarchy of defence equipment within which the direct and indirect life cycle costs of defence equipment may be allocated at different levels. Having reviewed the direct and indirect components of the life cycle cost, this paper then shows how different costing studies for different purposes require different approaches to life cycle costing, and that there is no unique life cycle cost which can be assigned to one particular item of defence equipment. There is instead a range oflife cycle costs, each of which is appropriate for a particular study, and it is important that a quoted cost of an item of defence equipment should be used only in the pertinent circumstances. The paper is written from a UK perspective and accordingly uses British nomenclature, but its principles should be relevant to defence cost studies in other nations.