On optimal aiming to hit a linear target

Typically weapon systems have an inherent systematic error and a random error for each round, centered around its mean point of impact. The systematic error is common to all aimings. Assume such a system for which there is a preassigned amount of ammunition of n rounds to engage a given target simultaneously, and which is capable of administering their fire with individual aiming points (allowing “offsets”). The objective is to determine the best aiming points for the system so as to maximize the probability of hitting the target by at least one of the n rounds. In this paper we focus on the special case where the target is linear (one‐dimensional) and there are no random errors. We prove that as long as the aiming error is symmetrically distributed and possesses one mode at zero, the optimal aiming is independent of the particular error distribution, and we specify the optimal aiming points. Possible extensions are further discussed, as well as civilian applications in manufacturing, radio‐electronics, and detection. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 323–333, 1999     

Book Reviews

National Security Concepts of States: New Zealand. By Kennedy Graham. Taylor & Francis, London (1989), ISBN 0-8448-1614-0, £27.00

Power and Prestige in the British Army. By R.G. L. von Zugbach. Gower, Aldershot (1988), ISBN 0-566-05561-9, £22.50

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare—Ideas, Organization, and Field Command. By Edward Hagerman. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1988), ISBN 0-253-30546-2, $37.50 (£23.29)

British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: a Reappraisal of Rearmament. By G. A. H. Gordon. Macmillan, London (1988), ISBN 0-333-42332-1. £29.50

Armies in Low-intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis. Edited by David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell. Brassey's Defence Publishers, London (1989), ISBN 0-08-036253-2, £25.00 ($45.00); Deadly Paradigms: the Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. By Michael Shafer, Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0-7185-1311-8, £28.00

British Defence Policy Striking the Right Balance. By J. Baylis. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-49133-5, £29.50 or £9.99     

A new approach for dealing with the startup problem in discrete event simulation

This article proposes a practical, data-based statistical procedure which can be used to reduce or remove bias owing to artificial startup conditions in simulations aimed at estimating steady-state means. We discuss results of experiments designed to choose good parameter values for this procedure, and present results of extensive testing of the procedure on a variety of stochastic models for which partial analytical results are available. The article closes with two illustrations of the application of the procedure to more complex statistical problems which are more representative of the kinds of purposes for which real-world steady-state simulation studies might be undertaken.     

An inventory model of incentives for on-time delivery in just-in-time purchasing contracts

This article formulates an analytic model of just-in-time purchasing contracts and compares the minimum cost solution with the cost attainable through vertical integration. The models use standard inventory theory cost parameters and decision variables. The results quantify the increase in cost of buying an item rather than making it. Optimal incentives are characterized when JIT purchasing contracts are used. When JIT purchasing is implemented, buffer inventories are typically reduced. This inventory reduction makes on-time delivery critical to the buyer; yet timeliness is controlled by the supplier. As an incentive to provide on-time delivery, the buyer offers the supplier a bonus for on-time delivery. The supplier chooses a flow time allowance based upon the bonus offered. First- and second-order conditions are characterized in general, and examples are provided for exponentially and uniformly distributed flow times. The delivery timeliness obtainable in a vertically integrated firm is determined and compared with timeliness obtainable between separate firms. This comparison indicates that buyers who choose to purchase materials from a separate firm are more likely to experience late deliveries. The relationship between the value of the bonus and the proportion of on-time deliveries is also considered. The bonus required to achieve the same probability of on-time delivery as under vertical integration is also determined. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Landmarks in defense literature

Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, 4 Vols, The Unknown War, The Aftermath. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York (1923-1931) and Marlborough, His Life and Times, 6 Vols. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York (1933-1938).     

Taking advantage of insurgencies: effective policies of state-sponsorship

Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo.     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

ANALYSING DEFENCE DEPENDENCY: THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON A SUB‐REGIONAL ECONOMY

This paper provides a methodology for estimating the economic impact of defence spending at a sub‐regional level. It does so by calculating the income and employment generated by Britain’s Royal Navy and associated defence activities in the City of Portsmouth and its surrounding area, during the financial year 2003–2004. In an era of military consolidation, the paper offers an insight into the multifaceted impact of defence‐related expenditure. Hence, it presents a generic framework that could prove useful to other researchers when seeking to measure the sub‐regional impact of naval, airforce and army facilities in other national contexts.