Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publication Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, all civilians (including child soldiers) lose their immunity from direct targeting ‘for so long as’ their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. All civilians can, however, access the revolving door of protection and return to their civilian activities – complete with full immunity from direct targeting – provided the nature of their direct participation was spontaneous and disorganised. Once it can be ascertained that their participation in hostilities amounts to continuous combative functions, they relinquish their access to the revolving door of protection, and can be targeted at all times until they abandon their formal or functional membership of the belligerent group. This piece analyses how the revolving door phenomenon and the notion of continuous combative functions apply in instances where civilian child soldiers are directly participating in hostilities.     

‘The People are Revolting’: An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency

Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterparts but differently, authoritarian regimes also engage in mobilisation, create narratives, and turn military advantage into political gain. The analysis explains how these tasks are undertaken and, by contradistinction, sheds light on more liberal approaches as well.     

The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity

Cyberspace is a new domain of operation, with its own characteristics. Cyber weapons differ qualitatively from kinetic ones: They generate effects by non-kinetic means through information, technology, and networks. Their properties, opportunities, and constraints are comparable to the qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. New weapons and their target sets in a new domain raise a series of unresolved policy challenges at the domestic, bilateral, and international levels about deterrence, attribution, and response. They also introduce new risks: uncertainty about unintended consequences, expectations of efficacy, and uncertainty about both the target’s and the international community’s response. Cyber operations offer considerable benefits for states to achieve strategic objectives both covertly and overtly. However, without a strategic framework to contain and possibly deter their use, make state and non-state behavior more predictable in the absence of reciprocal norms, and limit their impact, an environment where states face persistent attacks that nonetheless fall below the threshold of armed conflict presents a policy dilemma that reinforces collective insecurity.     

Moving the techno-science gap in Security Force Assistance

This paper looks at the impact of military technology diffusion on military assistance operations (MAO), in the United States known as Security Force Assistance or SFA. The discussion looks conceptually at the role of technological change and how it interacts with martial cultures in military assistant operations. I argue that growing trends in science and technology suggest potential conflicts between culture and technology. Relying on a culture-technology model drawn from anthropology, the paper contends that new technologies will present increasing challenges for the emerging MAO landscape. The paper will illustrate that the techno-science gap will continue to grow as innovations such as robotics, sensors, and networks continue to develop. Finally, the paper will look at ways to overcome this conflict between culture and technology.     

Toward optimal bidding strategies

In this paper we investigate a form of rational behavior in response to an oligopoly pricing problem where only one buyer is involved. We investigate the problem from the standpoint of the seller who wants to maximize his gain from the transaction. In particular, we deal with the problem of one seller's response to an invitation to submit a sealed (i. e., noncooperative) bid to a government or other dominant purchasing agency for supplying a specified bundle of goods and services for which either (1) no other demand exists, or (2) the terms or quantities involved cannot, at least in the short run, be obtained from another source. Although treated from a normative standpoint, i. e., what bid the supplier should make, the paper also has implications for the buyer's behavior and oligopoly-monopsony pricing in a more general sense.     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Critics gone wild: Counterinsurgency as the root of all evil

The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency – the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns have been bloody, violent, and protracted. Yet as this review highlights, beyond these central points, criticism of counterinsurgency is too often off the mark in its approach and totalizing in its pretentions. There is much to criticize and an urgent need to learn from past campaigns, yet bold claims and broad generalizations can mislead rather than enlighten. The analysis is particularly unhelpful when the definition of the central issue at hand – counterinsurgency – is being unwittingly or deliberately distorted. In the end, these two books form a poor basis for the debate that must now take place, because they are too ideological in tone, too undisciplined in approach, and therefore too unqualified in what they finally say.     

Life cycle costs for decision support ‐ a study of the various life cycle costs used at different levels of defence policy and management∗

Debates on many aspects of defence economics ‐ on the scale of defence expenditure, on the allocation of that expenditure to various military capabilities, and on the selection of equipment offering the best value for money ‐ are bedevilled by misunderstandings and misconceptions about the costs of defence equipment. This paper seeks to improve understanding of defence equipment costs by defining a hierarchy of defence equipment within which the direct and indirect life cycle costs of defence equipment may be allocated at different levels. Having reviewed the direct and indirect components of the life cycle cost, this paper then shows how different costing studies for different purposes require different approaches to life cycle costing, and that there is no unique life cycle cost which can be assigned to one particular item of defence equipment. There is instead a range oflife cycle costs, each of which is appropriate for a particular study, and it is important that a quoted cost of an item of defence equipment should be used only in the pertinent circumstances. The paper is written from a UK perspective and accordingly uses British nomenclature, but its principles should be relevant to defence cost studies in other nations.