Convoys to combat Somali piracy

As the world becomes increasingly globalized, interruptions to international trade cannot be permitted. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has hampered international trade in the region and poses significant risks to the sailors required to navigate those waters. Over the past three years the global community has attempted, through a number of different naval tactics, to stop these acts of piracy; however, these tactics have proven ineffective. This article looks at historical precedence and military theory to support the concept of using convoys to protect the thousands of cargo vessels traveling round the Horn of Africa every year. This tactic will greatly decrease the number of successful pirate attacks and save countless lives in the process.     

The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958–62

Unlike France, Britain viewed the Algerian conflict from 1958 to 1962 primarily as a colonial war. The British government regarded Algérie française as an anachronism, which France would have to relinquish one day. Though Britain was no stranger to ‘dirty’ colonial wars, as simultaneous operations against EOKA nationalists in Cyprus continued to prove, it was not averse to displaying a certain smugness at having averted the kind of mess Algeria seemed to represent. Britain's interest in the latter stages of the Algerian conflict centred on four major areas: Perceptions of colonial warfare; de Gaulle's Algeria policy; Algeria and Britain's view of France in Europe and NATO; Negotiating the ceasefire and ending the conflict.     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

Waypoint analysis for command and control

Command and Control (C2) in a military setting can be epitomized in battles‐of‐old when commanders would seek high ground to gain superior spatial‐temporal information; from this vantage point, decisions were made and relayed to units in the field. Although the fundamentals remain, technology has changed the practice of C2; for example, enemy units may be observed remotely, with instruments of varying positional accuracy. A basic problem in C2 is the ability to track an enemy object in the battlespace and to forecast its future position; the (extended) Kalman filter provides a straightforward solution. The problem changes fundamentally if one assumes that the moving object is headed for an (unknown) location, or waypoint. This article is concerned with the new problem of estimation of such a waypoint, for which we use Bayesian statistical prediction. The computational burden is greater than an ad hoc regression‐based estimate, which we also develop, but the Bayesian approach has a big advantage in that it yields both a predictor and a measure of its variability. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004     

Approximating nondominated sets in continuous multiobjective optimization problems

Many important problems in Operations Research and Statistics require the computation of nondominated (or Pareto or efficient) sets. This task may be currently undertaken efficiently for discrete sets of alternatives or for continuous sets under special and fairly tight structural conditions. Under more general continuous settings, parametric characterisations of the nondominated set, for example through convex combinations of the objective functions or ε‐constrained problems, or discretizations‐based approaches, pose several problems. In this paper, the lack of a general approach to approximate the nondominated set in continuous multiobjective problems is addressed. Our simulation‐based procedure only requires to sample from the set of alternatives and check whether an alternative dominates another. Stopping rules, efficient sampling schemes, and procedures to check for dominance are proposed. A continuous approximation to the nondominated set is obtained by fitting a surface through the points of a discrete approximation, using a local (robust) regression method. Other actions like clustering and projecting points onto the frontier are required in nonconvex feasible regions and nonconnected Pareto sets. In a sense, our method may be seen as an evolutionary algorithm with a variable population size. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian defence planning in a time of austerity

As Canada's military mission in Afghanistan winds down and the country faces several years of fiscal austerity, all of Canada's major political parties are agreed that Canadian defence budgets must stay level or be cut. This comes at a time when the defence department is slated to replace the Canadian Forces’ (CF) major equipment fleets. Canada's defence establishment thus faces some critical decisions. One option is to try to maintain its expeditionary capabilities across all three services: army, navy and air force. Absent substantial new infusions of funds, however, this approach is likely to lead to an overall and largely chaotic reduction of capabilities. Another option is to make some difficult choices as to which expeditionary capabilities to maintain as part of a strategic review of Canada's future military needs. Such an option would ensure that Canada has at least some military capacities which can reliably be devoted to the most demanding international operations, while maintaining those capabilities required for domestic duties and North American defence. Pursuing this option would accord with the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Concept and the call for “Smart Defense” within the Alliance. This article assesses the arguments for and against the option of specialising Canada's future defence capabilities and explores scenarios as to what a future CF may look like.