LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.     

Fortifications and the European Military Balance before 1914

This article analyses the evolution of permanent fortifications in Europe between 1870 and 1914. Despite the introduction in the 1880s of high explosive shells, intensive construction continued until the eve of war. Fortifications figured prominently in armaments budgets and in offensive as well as defensive strategic planning, while their design changed radically. Nonetheless, the pattern of development worked against the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary concentrated against Italy at the expense of the Balkans and Galicia; Germany concentrated on Alsace-Lorraine, neglecting the east until 1912. Whereas France modernised its eastern fortresses, Belgium did little, enticing Germany into the envelopment strategy that would draw Britain into the First World War.     

Indian Strategic Thinking about East Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, India's strategic horizons have moved beyond its traditional preoccupations in South Asia. India is developing a strategic role in East Asia in particular. At the same time India's strategic thinking has undergone a revolution, as the country that prided itself on non-alignment has moved closer to the West. But India's culture, history and geography still fundamentally shape its worldview. In engaging with East Asia, India is guided by a mosaic of strategic objectives about extending its sphere of influence, developing a multipolar regional system and balancing against China. The interplay of these objectives will frame India's role in East Asia in coming years.     

1918 Revisited1

This article re-evaluates the origins of the armistice of November 1918, drawing on German, French and British primary sources and on insights from work by political scientists on war termination. It examines why the German government decided to request a ceasefire and why the US, Britain and France decided to grant one. At first sight these decisions appear paradoxical in the light of the military-political situation at the time. In accounting for them the article stresses (on the German side) the campaigning on the Western Front over the previous months and (among Germany's opponents) the diplomatic tensions between Washington, London and Paris. Between them these considerations caused an unexpected and temporary convergence of perceived interests in favour of ending the conflict.     

The Freudian trap in combat motivation theory

Theories of group, and individual, motivation to fight have shown little real advancement since World War II. The lively debate between the proponents of ‘primary group’ and ideological theories has tended to preclude any other analysis. The debate has continued to generalise from the experience of the Wehrmacht and its cohesion in the face of appalling destruction. In this article I suggest that the theoretical underpinnings of the debate have revolved around one particular, and somewhat unrecognised, concept of the mind. Work on combat motivation owes a substantial debt to Freudian ideas concerning the unconscious and group psychology. Both sides of the ideology/primary group debate use Freudian ideas, often without realising it, and these concepts shape the various positions taken. Only by acknowledging and examining this underpinning can the debate move forward and produce a more general theory of combat motivation and group conflict with wider application.     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

The Radford Bombshell: Anglo-Australian-US Relations,Nuclear Weapons and the Defence of South East Asia, 1954-57

This article looks at the emergence of nuclear planning assumptions within the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) during the mid-1950s. It does so by examining US strategic concepts for the defence of the treaty area, and the ways these produced major problems for the Australian Government as it switched the emphasis in its defence policy toward a permanent commitment of forces to the South East Asian mainland. At the same time, Britain was struggling to reconcile its membership of SEATO with the need to effect economies in defence spending that would not alarm their Australian Commonwealth partners. As dissatisfaction within SEATO grew, both the US and Britain moved toward a more overt acceptance of nuclear planning assumptions that would reassure their allies without producing a greater call on their resources.     

The United States' Use of Exiles in Promoting Regime Change in Cuba, 1961 and Iraq, 2002–3

Issues raised by the United States' relations with and potential use of Iraqi exile groups in 2003–3 bear important similarities to those surrounding the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Fidel Castro's Cuba 40?years previously. In both cases, questions of legitimacy were of prime importance. In both cases too, the role played by the US had ramifications for the effectiveness of the exiles' own roles in the political and operational spheres. Finally, in each case the exile ‘movements’ were characterised by numerous, often rancorous, internal divisions, raising questions about their capacity to effectively constitute alternative governments.