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141.
Previous historical accounts have simplified the Labour government's decision to commission a four-boat strategic nuclear deterrent, or ‘Polaris force’, in early 1965. Utilising previously classified sources, this article shows that a number of key strategic concerns led the decision-making process. Nevertheless, broader economic and diplomatic considerations were also important in determining the size of the Polaris force. A tremendous balance of payments deficit and ongoing debates regarding levels of conventional and nuclear involvement in NATO certainly influenced the government's final decision. Moreover, competing strategic and economic interests resulted in continued debate throughout the decision-making process.  相似文献   
142.
In 1941, the British instituted a comprehensive system of convoys in the Atlantic. One of the first convoys, OG 71, while sailing between Britain and Gibraltar, was shadowed by German aircraft and attacked by U‐boats. In the ensuing August battle, while no U‐boats were sunk, the British lost, out of a convoy consisting of 22 vessels, two escorts and eight merchant ships. The German victory was not complete owing to the inability of the German aircraft and U‐boats to cooperate successfully as well as the failure of the U‐boats to fight the battle effectively and aggressively. The British also made many mistakes during the defence of Convoy OG 71. The surface escorts made many errors of tactics; as for the British aircraft, owing to an inability to cooperate with the surface forces, they became almost totally ineffective. One bright spot for the British during the battle, however, was communications intelligence. The battle saw the first use of high frequency direction finders and on several occasions skillful use was made of information obtained from enemy radio transmissions. In fact important lessons were learned by the British from such use of communications intelligence which would pave the way for a more effective implementation of such information in future convoy battles.  相似文献   
143.
Building indigenous armies in Asia with military advisory and aid programs has been a mission of the United States Army for over 100 years. Creation of an indigenous army was an early goal of American occupation policy in Korea, but little support and resources were assigned. Between 1946 and 1948, a minute American advisory effort partially trained and equipped a Korean Army cadre of 25,000 men. The unceasing efforts of a talented American advisor, Captain James Hausman, made success possible. He dominated the small advisory group, was given carte blanche to implement his ideas, and left indelible changes on what became the South Korean Army.  相似文献   
144.
Counter-insurgency scholars have long been familiar with Sir Robert Thompson’s classic work Defeating Communist Insurgency, which combined analysis of the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam with advice for counter-insurgents that emphasised the drawn-out nature of insurgency and the importance of focusing on population security. While historians have called attention to his role with the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam and his later criticism of the US counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam in his various books, less has been written about his subsequent role as a pacification advisor to the Nixon administration. This article explores Thompson’s relationship with Kissinger and Nixon and his views on the war in Vietnam from 1969 to 1974. An examination of Thompson’s thinking on Vietnam in the Nixon years reveals a theorist whose optimism on US prospects there was based on assumptions about elite and public patience for lengthy wars that were ultimately misplaced.  相似文献   
145.
Book Reviews     
The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.  相似文献   
146.
147.
Washington's so-called Maritime Strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to full fruition during the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow”s strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war. Relying on a variety of interviews and newly declassified documents, the authors assert that the Maritime Strategy represents one of the rare instances in history when intelligence helped lead a nation to completely revise its concept of military operations.  相似文献   
148.
149.
There have been growing claims in media circles and law-enforcement settings that street gangs and criminal groups are turning to Internet-based social networking sites for various reasons ranging from the showcasing of their images and exploits to the suspected recruitment of members. The present study investigates whether such a trend is, in fact, in place. The presence of street gangs on these Internet sites is referred to as cyberbanging. While there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that gangs are turning to social networking sites, there is little available research on exactly how street gangs and criminal groups use the Internet. Our main argument is that gang culture is in many ways an individualized phenomenon and this feature ties in directly with recent assessments of the Internet as a setting that is governed by a process of networked individualism. This theoretical link between the individualized gang setting and the presence of gang members on social networking sites helps us understand why recruitment is improbable even in a context where people are openly diffusing their image and exploits to a growing number of Internet users. The empirical segment of this research adds to this general outlook. Based on a keyword search of over 50 street gang names, the three main social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace) were monitored for street gang presence. Results illustrate that gang presence on social networking sites is linked primarily to promoting a general gang or street culture through individual displays. In regard to the visitors to such sites, there is no evidence that they are being tricked or manipulated in any way. They are, however, showing their curiosity in regard to such groups and, for those who share their comments and opinions, signs of support are evident. Thus, whereas criminal gangs are not proactively using the Internet to convert anyone into being gang members, social networking sites are creating a new venue for people who share or are sensitive to the values underlying street gang lifestyle to come together. These sites essentially create a new convergence setting for gang members to interact with a wider number of people who would probably never have been exposed to their lifestyles and exploits through physical interactions. The study's conclusion extends these findings toward further research in this area, as well as outlining the more relevant implications for law-enforcement monitoring of this growing phenomenon.  相似文献   
150.
Book reviews     
The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3  相似文献   
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