全文获取类型
收费全文 | 268篇 |
免费 | 10篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 4篇 |
2019年 | 13篇 |
2018年 | 9篇 |
2017年 | 4篇 |
2016年 | 8篇 |
2015年 | 7篇 |
2014年 | 9篇 |
2013年 | 90篇 |
2011年 | 8篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 4篇 |
2007年 | 7篇 |
2006年 | 4篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 2篇 |
2003年 | 5篇 |
2002年 | 4篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 5篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 4篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 6篇 |
1993年 | 4篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 3篇 |
1990年 | 3篇 |
1989年 | 4篇 |
1988年 | 4篇 |
1987年 | 4篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 2篇 |
1984年 | 1篇 |
1983年 | 3篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1979年 | 3篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1975年 | 3篇 |
1974年 | 1篇 |
1973年 | 3篇 |
1972年 | 4篇 |
1971年 | 2篇 |
1970年 | 4篇 |
1969年 | 1篇 |
1968年 | 2篇 |
1967年 | 1篇 |
1966年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有278条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
71.
72.
We consider the problem of efficiently scheduling deliveries by an uncapacitated courier from a central location under online arrivals. We consider both adversary‐controlled and Poisson arrival processes. In the adversarial setting we provide a randomized (3βΔ/2δ ? 1) ‐competitive algorithm, where β is the approximation ratio of the traveling salesman problem, δ is the minimum distance between the central location and any customer, and Δ is the length of the optimal traveling salesman tour overall customer locations and the central location. We provide instances showing that this analysis is tight. We also prove a 1 + 0.271Δ/δ lower‐bound on the competitive ratio of any algorithm in this setting. In the Poisson setting, we relax our assumption of deterministic travel times by assuming that travel times are distributed with a mean equal to the excursion length. We prove that optimal policies in this setting follow a threshold structure and describe this structure. For the half‐line metric space we bound the performance of the randomized algorithm in the Poisson setting, and show through numerical experiments that the performance of the algorithm is often much better than this bound. 相似文献
73.
The global financial turmoil of 2008 has resulted in the curtailment of military expenditure in most western countries. At a sub-regional-level reductions in the level of activity at a major military facility can have significant economic impact. In the light of this, the paper has two objectives: to analyse the impact of the decision to terminate naval shipbuilding at the United Kingdom’s Portsmouth Naval Base; and, for illustrative purposes, to examine the possible economic consequences of further contraction at the facility. In pursuit of these aims, it is necessary to establish the output, income and employment generated by the base using a bespoke input–output model. The methodology employed can, with appropriate adjustments, be utilised in other military or civilian contexts. 相似文献
74.
We consider a version of the famous bin-packing problem where the cost of a bin is a concave function of the number of items in the bin. We analyze the problem from an average-case point of view and develop techniques to determine the asymptotic optimal solution value for a variety of functions. We also describe heuristic techniques that are asymptotically optimal. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 673–686, 1997 相似文献
75.
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental managerial function typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the process is seldom approached as an optimization problem over the reported preferences of all agents. This is due in part to the underlying computational complexity that occurs when intra-team interpersonal interactions are taken into consideration, and also due to game-theoretic considerations, when those taking part in the process are self-interested agents. Variants of this fundamental decision problem arise in a number of settings, including, for example, human resources and project management, military platooning, ride sharing, data clustering, and in assigning students to group projects. In this article, we study an analytical approach to “team formation” focused on the interplay between two of the most common objectives considered in the related literature: economic efficiency (i.e., the maximization of social welfare) and game-theoretic stability (e.g., finding a core solution when one exists). With a weighted objective across these two goals, the problem is modeled as a bi-level binary optimization problem, and transformed into a single-level, exponentially sized binary integer program. We then devise a branch-cut-and-price algorithm and demonstrate its efficacy through an extensive set of simulations, with favorable comparisons to other algorithms from the literature. 相似文献
76.
In September 1878 the British Museum received a donation of a folded metal plate which had been embossed and gilded. Restoration of the object revealed that the folded plate was in fact the outer casing of a Roman copper alloy cavalry sports type helmet which dates to the late second or third century AD. The story of what became known as the Guisborough helmet began 14 years earlier in what was then the North Riding of Yorkshire when workers employed by the Cleveland Railway Company discovered a ‘very curious plate of metal’ during road construction. It appears that the helmet was deliberately prepared for deposition and buried at a depth of c30 cm close to a stream. Examination by the authors suggests that this was a high value item that had been repaired many times. Experimental evidence suggests that the decoration alone required approximately 16 h to fashion. 相似文献
77.
Whose preferences determine the tradeoff between security and civilian output in deciding upon budget allocations to defence? This paper considers the role that consumer preferences might play in influencing military spending. We propose normative criteria to judge the economic or political efficiency of defence provision at a given time, and test them using Australian survey‐based micro‐data. Our results suggest that the political system has not delivered a simple social‐choice translation of individual preferences into collective outcomes, nor has it delivered results consistent with simple majority‐voting median preferences. 相似文献
78.
David Gold 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(3):251-266
Using tests of a single equation model and cointegration techniques, this paper finds no evidence of a long run trade‐off, and some evidence of a short‐run trade‐off, between military spending and investment in post‐World War II United States data. The short‐run trade‐off is confined to the 1949–1971 period, and may be the result of the sharp expansion and contraction of military outlays in connection with the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In addition, cointegration techniques are used to identify a possible long‐run trade‐off between military spending and consumption. 相似文献
79.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publication Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, all civilians (including child soldiers) lose their immunity from direct targeting ‘for so long as’ their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. All civilians can, however, access the revolving door of protection and return to their civilian activities – complete with full immunity from direct targeting – provided the nature of their direct participation was spontaneous and disorganised. Once it can be ascertained that their participation in hostilities amounts to continuous combative functions, they relinquish their access to the revolving door of protection, and can be targeted at all times until they abandon their formal or functional membership of the belligerent group. This piece analyses how the revolving door phenomenon and the notion of continuous combative functions apply in instances where civilian child soldiers are directly participating in hostilities. 相似文献
80.
Scott Helfstein 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):385-405
This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions. 相似文献