The Persistent Deficit of Militia Officers in the Swiss Armed Forces: An Opportunity Cost Explanation

The Swiss Armed Forces are suffering from a structural deficit of militia officers despite good pay and a general supportive attitude in the population. Whereas, prior studies have focused on motivation to explain understaffing in armed forces, we offer an alternative approach based on opportunity cost. We model decision alternatives both within and outside a military organization, taking private sector employment as the reference point. We then monetize opportunity costs of leisure, fringe benefits, and private sector income not compensated. Our results suggest that in terms of opportunity cost, service as a militia officer is the least attractive option, an effect that we believe explains the persistent staff deficit. Implications of these findings for the literature and recruitment policy are discussed.     

Interpreting the Ribchester Helmet

In 1796 a 13-year-old boy playing on wasteland behind his father’s house in Ribchester, Lancashire discovered an assemblage of over 30 Roman artefacts, including a decorated brass helmet. Although partially corroded the Ribchester helmet is a fine example of a first-century AD cavalry sports helmet. This article considers how the interpretation of the helmet has evolved since its discovery. The multi-faceted iconography of the helmet with its mural crown diadem is that of an elite soldier and is paralleled in other examples of cavalry sports helmets of the Ribchester type. The long-neglected imagery on the helmet bowl is reinterpreted and seen not as a haphazard collection of randomly placed combatants but as a highly structured, symmetrical composition specifically designed to be viewed from different directions.     

Ethnicity,class, and civil war: the role of hierarchy,segmentation, and cross-cutting cleavages

Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory, and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies shapes the type of civil war.     

Building the next nuclear community

This viewpoint takes stock of the changes in the strategic nuclear landscape in recent decades and reflects on its consequences on the policy community. It finds that the number and scope of issues have expanded considerably; they have manifested themselves in many more regions of the world; and they have become deeply politicized and polarized. The consequences have been twofold: the nuclear policy field has seen the development of an increasingly diverse expert community composed of highly specialized functionalists and regionalists, and it has become ever more divided into two entirely separate ideological camps—one that believes in deterrence, the other in disarmament. The stove-piping of expertise and the widening gap between deterrence and disarmament ideologies are immensely problematic because, in different ways, they stand in the way of the emergence of a better and safer nuclear future. Looking ahead, it is critical to “bust the silos of expertise” and to build bridges between the deterrence and disarmament ideological camps. Only such a community-building effort will help solve today’s and tomorrow’s nuclear challenges.     

THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

The nuclear weapon states (NWS) have different perspectives on the desirability and feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons. A review of each of the current nuclear doctrines, postures, and disarmament policies of the five NWS shows that there is a clear divide between them, with some showing relatively determined leadership (the United States and the United Kingdom) and others expressing skepticism, if not complete disinterest (France, Russia, and China). Nevertheless, the prospects for progress on disarmament by the NWS at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remain reasonably good. Yet complete success will require much time as well as sustained and applied efforts from the NWS, first and foremost to improve their performance as international security guarantors.     

The impact of exponential smoothing forecasts on the bullwhip effect

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as one moves up the supply chain, i.e., as one moves away from customer demand. In this paper we quantify this effect for simple, two‐stage, supply chains consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. We demonstrate that the use of an exponential smoothing forecast by the retailer can cause the bullwhip effect and contrast these results with the increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. We consider two types of demand processes, a correlated demand process and a demand process with a linear trend. We then discuss several important managerial insights that can be drawn from this research. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 269–286, 2000     

When is greedy module assembly optimal?

Many coherent systems are configurations of identically structured modules, each consisting of a number of different components. The objective is to assemble the modules out of a collection of available components, and to install the modules in the system in a way that maximizes reliability. The greedy assembly rule builds one module out of the best available components, another out of the best remaining components, and so on. This article shows that greedy assembly is optimal whenever the modules have a series structure, no matter what the structure of the system in which the modules will be used might be, provided that the modules, once assembled, are installed in the system in an optimal way. The article also demonstrates that series modules are unique in this regard.     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

Beyond Just War: Military Strategy for the Common Good

The objective of this article is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilising the common good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organising concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This article constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this article is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war, irregular war, deterrence, and cyberwar.