Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the conditions for effectiveness in these campaigns. It challenges the historiography of the case by framing armed confrontations and raids as enablers of politics rather than ends in themselves; indeed, in both the conduct and study of intervention, politics must reign supreme.     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

FDs and Military Reform

Abstract

Ron Smith looks at procurement procedures within a European context, taking account of the problems currently facing defence industries and aduocates the institution of a European Defence Union, to be closely monitored by a joint finance Ministry to prevent overspending and monopoly.     

Degeneracy in inventory models

In order‐quantity reorder‐point formulations for inventory items where backordering is allowed, some of the more common ways to prevent excessive stockouts in an optimal solution are to impose either a cost per unit short, a cost per stockout occasion, or a target fill rate. We show that these popular formulations, both exact and approximate, can become “degenerate” even with quite plausible parameters. By degeneracy we mean any situation in which the formulation either cannot be solved, leads to nonsensical “optimal” solutions, or becomes equivalent to something substantially simpler. We explain the reasons for the degeneracies, yielding new insight into these models, and we provide practical advice for inventory managers. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 686–705, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10037