Fortifications and the European Military Balance before 1914

This article analyses the evolution of permanent fortifications in Europe between 1870 and 1914. Despite the introduction in the 1880s of high explosive shells, intensive construction continued until the eve of war. Fortifications figured prominently in armaments budgets and in offensive as well as defensive strategic planning, while their design changed radically. Nonetheless, the pattern of development worked against the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary concentrated against Italy at the expense of the Balkans and Galicia; Germany concentrated on Alsace-Lorraine, neglecting the east until 1912. Whereas France modernised its eastern fortresses, Belgium did little, enticing Germany into the envelopment strategy that would draw Britain into the First World War.     

The Freudian trap in combat motivation theory

Theories of group, and individual, motivation to fight have shown little real advancement since World War II. The lively debate between the proponents of ‘primary group’ and ideological theories has tended to preclude any other analysis. The debate has continued to generalise from the experience of the Wehrmacht and its cohesion in the face of appalling destruction. In this article I suggest that the theoretical underpinnings of the debate have revolved around one particular, and somewhat unrecognised, concept of the mind. Work on combat motivation owes a substantial debt to Freudian ideas concerning the unconscious and group psychology. Both sides of the ideology/primary group debate use Freudian ideas, often without realising it, and these concepts shape the various positions taken. Only by acknowledging and examining this underpinning can the debate move forward and produce a more general theory of combat motivation and group conflict with wider application.     

1918 Revisited1

This article re-evaluates the origins of the armistice of November 1918, drawing on German, French and British primary sources and on insights from work by political scientists on war termination. It examines why the German government decided to request a ceasefire and why the US, Britain and France decided to grant one. At first sight these decisions appear paradoxical in the light of the military-political situation at the time. In accounting for them the article stresses (on the German side) the campaigning on the Western Front over the previous months and (among Germany's opponents) the diplomatic tensions between Washington, London and Paris. Between them these considerations caused an unexpected and temporary convergence of perceived interests in favour of ending the conflict.     

More military base closure? Considering the alternatives*

Despite multiple base closing rounds, the United States Department of Defense still has excess base capacity, and thus President Trump and high-level Defense Department officials are calling for more base closure through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. However, another BRAC may not be the optimal solution, because simple base closure is not an efficient way to reduce surplus base capacity. Thus, Defense Department officials should consider other methods to reduce surplus capacity, including reduction in base size, leasing excess base property, or transferring it to another government agency for a variety of alternative uses. The surplus capacity issue also offers an opportunity to DOD to reassess base utilization, to update base requirements with current and future force structure. While BRAC focuses on American military bases, the process and alternatives also have international applications.     

See the light: Optimization of put-to-light order picking systems

Put-to-light order picking systems invert the basic logic of conventional picker-to-parts systems. Instead of successively visiting the storage positions of the stock keeping units (SKUs) when collecting picking orders, an order picker accompanies successive bins each containing multiple items of a specific SKU along a lane of subsequent orders. Whenever the picker passes an order requiring the current SKU, which is indicated by a light signal, she puts the requested number of items into the bin associated with the order. Such an order picking system is well-suited if the assortment is not overly large and all orders demand similar SKUs, so that it is mainly applied in distribution centers of brick-and-mortar retail chains. This paper evaluates four different setups of put-to-light systems, which, during operations, require the solution of different storage assignment and SKU sequencing problems. We formulate these problems, prove computational complexity, and suggest suited solution algorithms. By applying these algorithms in a comprehensive computational study, we benchmark the impact of the four different setups on picking performance. In this way, warehouse managers receive decision support on how to set up their put-to-light systems.     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

An inventory model of incentives for on-time delivery in just-in-time purchasing contracts

This article formulates an analytic model of just-in-time purchasing contracts and compares the minimum cost solution with the cost attainable through vertical integration. The models use standard inventory theory cost parameters and decision variables. The results quantify the increase in cost of buying an item rather than making it. Optimal incentives are characterized when JIT purchasing contracts are used. When JIT purchasing is implemented, buffer inventories are typically reduced. This inventory reduction makes on-time delivery critical to the buyer; yet timeliness is controlled by the supplier. As an incentive to provide on-time delivery, the buyer offers the supplier a bonus for on-time delivery. The supplier chooses a flow time allowance based upon the bonus offered. First- and second-order conditions are characterized in general, and examples are provided for exponentially and uniformly distributed flow times. The delivery timeliness obtainable in a vertically integrated firm is determined and compared with timeliness obtainable between separate firms. This comparison indicates that buyers who choose to purchase materials from a separate firm are more likely to experience late deliveries. The relationship between the value of the bonus and the proportion of on-time deliveries is also considered. The bonus required to achieve the same probability of on-time delivery as under vertical integration is also determined. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.