Ethnicity,class, and civil war: the role of hierarchy,segmentation, and cross-cutting cleavages

Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory, and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies shapes the type of civil war.     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

孙中山军队政治工作思想初探

孙中山认为中国资产阶级革命失败的原因在于多年来时断时续地依附其他军阀的军队,缺乏政治工作,没有用革命的主义来武装军队。十月革命后,孙中山在师法苏俄模式建军的实践中开始了创立革命军队政治工作的尝试。其做法主要有：一、确立以党治军原则,建立党代表制度;二、创立政治工作制度,施行政治训练;三、按照黄埔党军的模式改造旧军队。     

反舰导弹典型攻击模式及运动仿真研究

针对当前反舰导弹的主要特点,研究国外典型反舰导弹的攻击模式和运动仿真模型。采用简化六自由度动力学模型,对其典型航迹进行了模型描述,建立了导弹蛇形机动、比例导引、末端跃升俯冲航迹的动力学仿真模型,并得到了几种典型航迹的仿真结果,为水面舰艇的防空反导作战提供了理论支持。     

精密坐标镗床CNC系统研究

介绍了作者研制的通用ＣＮＣ系统,该系统以ＡＳＴ３８６作为控制器,采用ＰＷＭ驱动直流伺服电机,并配以软、硬件接口;文中对该系统的主要组成部分作了分析,在此基础上应用传统的ＰＩＤ控制方法设计数字控制器;最后通过实验验证了该系统的输出响应和控制器的性能。     

Effects of cueing in cooperative search

We consider the effects of cueing in a cooperative search mission that involves several autonomous agents. Two scenarios are discussed: one in which the search is conducted by a number of identical search‐and‐engage vehicles and one where these vehicles are assisted by a search‐only (reconnaissance) asset. The cooperation between the autonomous agents is facilitated via cueing, i.e., the information transmitted to the agents by a searcher that has just detected a target. The effect of cueing on the target detection probability is derived from first principles using a Markov chain analysis. In particular, it is demonstrated that the benefit of cueing on the system's effectiveness is bounded. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

The impact of manufacturer rebates on supply chain profits

Manufacturer rebates are commonly used as price discount tools for attracting end customers. In this study, we consider a two‐stage supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where a single seasonal product faces uncertain and price‐sensitive demand. We characterize the impact of a manufacturer rebate on the expected profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We show that unless all of the customers claim the rebate, the rebate always benefits the manufacturer. Our results thus imply that “mail‐in rebates,” where some customers end up not claiming the rebate, particularly when the size of the rebate is relatively small, always benefit the manufacturer. On the other hand, an “instant rebate,” such as the one offered in the automotive industry where every customer redeems the rebate on the spot when he/she purchases a car, does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007