Bounded flexibility in days‐on and days‐off scheduling

This article presents a flexible days‐on and days‐off scheduling problem and develops an exact branch and price (B&P) algorithm to find solutions. The main objective is to minimize the size of the total workforce required to cover time‐varying demand over a planning horizon that may extend up to 12 weeks. A new aspect of the problem is the general restriction that the number of consecutive days on and the number of consecutive days off must each fall within a predefined range. Moreover, the total assignment of working days in the planning horizon cannot exceed some maximum value. In the B&P framework, the master problem is stated as a set covering‐type problem whose columns are generated iteratively by solving one of three different subproblems. The first is an implicit model, the second is a resource constrained shortest path problem, and the third is a dynamic program. Computational experiments using both real‐word and randomly generated data show that workforce reductions up to 66% are possible with highly flexible days‐on and days‐off patterns. When evaluating the performance of the three subproblems, it was found that each yielded equivalent solutions but the dynamic program proved to be significantly more efficient. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 678–701, 2013     

Basra's not Belfast: the British Army, ‘Small Wars’ and Iraq

This article examines British Army operations in Iraq. It focuses on the causes of the army's apparent failure to live up to its reputation for the conduct of small wars. The paper discusses the British experience of small wars in the context of Iraq, the influence of doctrine and strategy, and the political and moral factors that shaped the army's performance. The paper's conclusions suggest that the Iraq War may cause a significant reappraisal, not just of military doctrine and strategy, but also of Britain's role in future small wars.     

Book reviews

Book Review: The Future of the Defence Firm: New Challenges, New Directions. Edited by Andrew Latham and Nicholas Hooper NATO ASI Series, Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN 0–7923–3268–7

James E. Payne and Anandi P. Sahu (eds.) Defense Spending &; Economic Growth, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.     

Missile systems: “Flexible modularity” and incremental technological change in military production∗

It is often stated that technological change in the military field is characterised by the introduction of radical innovations rather than by incremental processes of technological change. This article illustrates the diversity of military innovation by arguing that technological change in missiles systems is dominated by incremental change. While some large weapons platforms display the design rigidities normally associated with complex systems, missiles are characterised by “flexible modularity”. Flexible modularity facilitates the continuous introduction of upgrades, and makes missile systems amenable to gradual technological change. Besides, it has significant implications for the future role of missile systems, and poses special problems for missile disarmament and technology control initiatives.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

A RANDOM RATIONING MECHANISM WHICH REDUCES THE RISKS OF NO SON LEFT AT HOME

This paper empirically re‐examines the long‐run co‐movements and the causal relationships between GDP and defence expenditures in a multivariate model with real defence expenditure per capita (ME), real GDP per capita (GDP), and real capital stock per capita (K). We apply the view of the aggregate production function to construct the empirical model. Using up‐to‐date data for 27 OECD countries and 62 non‐OECD countries for the 1988–2003 period, we combine cross‐sectional and time series data to re‐investigate the relationship between GDP and ME. Previous studies using time series data may have yielded misleading results on account of the short time span of typical datasets. By contrast, we use recently developed panel unit root tests and heterogeneous panel cointegration tests, and conclude that there is fairly strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis of a long‐run equilibrium relationship between GDP and ME. The long‐run panel regression parameter results, such as the fully modified OLS, indicate that a positive relationship between GDP and ME only holds for OECD countries, whereas a negative relationship from ME to GDP only exists in non‐OECD countries under examination and in the panel as a whole. Furthermore, by implementing the dynamic panel‐based error correction model, we determine that GDP and ME lack short‐run causalities, but do show long‐run bidirectional causalities in both OECD and non‐OECD countries.     

THE LONG‐RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GDP IN TAIWAN

Using the Solow–Swan growth model and the time‐trend included in the aggregate production function, this study applies the multivariate cointegration approach to re‐investigate the long‐run and causal relationships between defence expenditures and GDP while controlling for capital and labour input in Taiwan during the 1955–2002 period. It examines the long‐run causal relationship using the weak exogeneity test and utilizes general impulse response functions to determine whether a shock to defence expenditures affects economic growth or vice versa. Our findings provide substantive evidence in favour of the existence of a long‐run equilibrium cointegrated relationship between defence expenditures, GDP, labour and capital stock. The results of the weak exogeneity test indicate that a bi‐directional causal relationship exists in the long‐run between defence expenditures and GDP. Thus, the main policy implication that emerges from the long‐run results is that increasing defence expenditures in Taiwan is an effective means to boost overall economic performance and, with this improved economy, it should then be able to increase its defence expenditures further. Lastly, from our dynamic vector error correction model estimations, it is found that defence expenditures are a major means of adjusting for disequilibria that occur within the system.     

EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING ON THE PROFITABILITY OF SPANISH DEFENCE CONTRACTORS

The traditional view of the defence industry obtaining large profits from contracts with the Ministry of Defence relies on several assumptions. Among these are the use of such arrangements as an instrument of industrial policy, the strong market power enjoyed by prime contractors, and the inefficiency encouraged by the sector. The findings show that defence contracts have a positive effect on profits, as well as the prizes for innovation and the market power enjoyed by some defence subsectors.