The United States and Latin America: Shaping an elusive future

This article presents a regional overview of US‐Latin American security relations, focusing on those countries where US national security interests are most likely to be endangered over the next two decades. The author examines the current US strategy of ‘shaping’ the Latin security environment, with a view to assessing the strength and weaknesses of this approach. The article presents some policy recommendations, including the recommendation that the US do more to redress the historical imbalance in Latin American civil‐military relations by strengthening civilian institutions. It also argues that at the regional level a major effort be made to recapture momentum toward the creation of a Free Trade Association of the Americas.     

Expeditionary police advising: some causes of failure

ABSTRACT

The practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject.     

A stochastic air combat logistics decision model for Blue versus Red opposition

Technologically advanced aircraft rely on robust and responsive logistics systems to ensure a high state of operational readiness. This paper fills a critical gap in the literature for combat models by closely relating effectiveness of the logistics system to determinants of success in combat. We present a stochastic diffusion model of an aerial battle between Blue and Red forces. The number of aircraft of Blue forces aloft and ready to be aloft on combat missions is limited by the maximum number of assigned aircraft, the reliability of aircraft subsystems, and the logistic system's ability to repair and replenish those subsystems. Our parsimonious model can illustrate important trade‐offs between logistics decision variables and operational success.     

The optimal linear combination of control variates in the presence of asymptotically negligible bias

The optimal linear combination of control variates is well known when the controls are assumed to be unbiased. We derive here the optimal linear combination of controls in the situation where asymptotically negligible bias is present. The small-sample linear control which minimizes the mean square error (MSE) is derived. When the optimal asymptotic linear control is used rather than the optimal small-sample control, the degradation in MSE is c/n³, where n is the sample size and c is a known constant. This analysis is particulary relevant to the small-sample theory for control variates as applied to the steady-state estimation problem. Results for the method of multiple estimates are also given.     

The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.