British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

An alliance between Cyprus and Greece: assessing its partners’ relative security contribution

The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey.     

Robustness of the normal approximation of lead-time demand in a distribution setting

Previous studies criticize the general use of the normal approximation of lead-time demand on the grounds that it can lead to serious errors in safety stock. We reexamine this issue for the distribution of fast-moving finished goods. We first determine the optimal reorder points and quantities by using the classical normal-approximation method and a theoretically correct procedure. We then evaluate the misspecification error of the normal approximation solution with respect to safety stock, logistics-system costs, total costs (logistics costs, including acquisition costs), and fill rates. The results provide evidence that the normal approximation is robust with respect to both cost and service for seven major industry groups. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 165–186, 1997     

Heuristic scheduling of resource-constrained projects with cash flows

Resource-constrained project scheduling with cash flows occurs in many settings, ranging from research and development to commercial and residential construction. Although efforts have been made to develop efficient optimal procedures to maximize the net present value of cash flows for resource-constrained projects, the inherent intractability of the problem has led to the development of a variety of heuristic methods to aid in the development of near-optimal schedules for large projects. This research focuses on the use of insights gained from the solution of a relaxed optimization model in developing heuristic procedures to schedule projects with multiple constrained resources. It is shown that a heuristic procedure with embedded priority rules that uses information from the revised solution of a relaxed optimization model increases project net present value. The heuristic procedure and nine different embedded priority rules are tested in a variety of project environments that account for different network structures, levels of resource constrainedness, and cash-flow parameters. Extensive testing with problems ranging in size from 21 to 1000 activities shows that the new heuristic procedures dominate heuristics using information from the critical path method (CPM), and in most cases outperform heuristics from previous research. The best performing heuristic rules classify activities into priority and secondary queues according to whether they lead to immediate progress payments, thus front loading the project schedule. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 365–381, 1997     

Globalization's Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law

The international system has great difficulty in dealing with illegitimate non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates. This is due to two main factors: the quality and quantity of influence these illegitimate actors have obtained in an era of globalization, and the fact that international law considers only individual criminals and terrorists as subjects, rather than the entire illegitimate enterprise, and does not adequately link individuals, enterprises and states to more nuanced and complex forms of sponsorship of illegal activities. This work offers an outline for tools that should be embedded in the fabric of international law and agreements, to sustain credibility against illegal non-state actors, to hold accountable  sponsors of illegality and to reinforce the legitimacy of globalization.     

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

Abstract

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.     

‘A Better War?’ – The View from the Nixon White House

This article examines the relationship between the White House and the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during President Richard M. Nixon's administration. It argues that dysfunctional civil-military relations between 1969 and 1972 undermined the implementation of a sound military strategy during the United States' withdrawal from South Vietnam as Nixon attempted to achieve ‘peace with honor’ during the Vietnam War's final campaigns. By 1972, the relationship between the White House and MACV headquarters had reached the nadir of civil-military relations during the Southeast Asian conflict and had served to undercut the United States' ability to effectively disengage from a long and bitterly contested war.