通用对潜搜索作战模型效能计算方法

对潜搜索模型有很多种,并且这些搜索模型可能因为进一部的完善、优化而发生改变;根据装备的发展及部队作战、训练的需要,也可能有新的模型不断加入。这些模型的作战效果指标是决定其是否可用的重要依据之一,而作战效果的计算应基于统一的方法,而不能各自不同,这样,得出的结论才具有可比性。为了实现这个目的,建立了基于蒙特卡罗法的通用计算搜索效率指标的仿真算法原理和计算步骤,并给出基于该样式的实际应用例子。     

Some recent findings in bayesian attribute single and double sampling

This article deals with several items, including theoretical and applied results. Specific topics include (1) a discrete, economically based, attributes acceptance sampling model and its adaptations, (2) relevant costs, (3) relevant prior distributions, (4) comparison of single- and double-sampling results, and (5) reasons for marginal implementation success following excellent implementation efforts. The basic model used is one developed by Guthrie and Johns; adaptations include provisions for fixed costs as well as modifications to permit double sampling. Optimization is exact, rather than approximate. Costs incorporated into the model are for sampling inspection, lot acceptance, and lot rejection. For each of these three categories a fixed cost is included as well as two variable costs, one for each item and the other for each defective item. Discrete prior distributions for the number of defectives in a lot are used exclusively. These include the mixed binomial and Polya distributions. Single- and double-sampling results are compared. Double sampling regularly performs at only slightly lower cost per lot than single sampling. Also, some cost and prior distribution sensitivity results are presented. Comments are provided regarding actual implementation experiences in industry. Practical deficiencies with the Bayesian approach are described, and a recommendation for future research is offered.     

Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.