舰艇红外隐身技术的探讨

舰艇红外隐身技术在现代战争中发挥着越来越重要的作用.定性描述了舰艇的主要红外辐射源,定量分析了舰艇和背景的红外辐射特征,通过分析舰艇对红外隐身的要求,结合舰艇红外隐身的发展现状,研究了舰艇红外隐身技术所采取的措施.     

舰船航渡过程中的松弛时间与航渡策略问题

针对舰船特点和任务要求,提出了舰船航渡中的松弛时间问题。在对问题分析的基础上,给出了松弛时间的定义并对其进行了建模,讨论了航渡失败的判断准则,给出了松弛时间的上下限以及航渡中实际的松弛时间的计算方法,并采用仿真的方法进行了典型航渡过程的松弛时间和成功概率的计算。在大量计算的基础上,初步探讨了航渡成功概率与各类航渡参数之间的关系,并对舰船最优航渡策略问题进行了初步分析,最后对于优化目标、计算初值、结果的表达方式等提出了一个可行的解决方案。     

一类微分方程组极限环的不存在性

在系统奇点唯一的条件下,研究了一类微分方程组不存在极限环的的充分条件,运用和发展了以往的结果。     

战场环境下无人车辆战术机动路径规划方法

针对不同类型威胁体存在的战场环境中无人车辆战术机动路径规划问题,提出了一种基于威胁代价地图的粒子群优化（Particle Swarm Optimization,PSO）方法。借助极坐标系中关键点的极角进行路径描述,并使用分段3次Hermite插值方法形成光滑路径,将路径规划问题转化为关键点极角的参数优化问题。针对基本PSO（BPSO）算法存在的早熟收敛和后期迭代效率低的缺陷,借鉴以群集方式生活的物种按照不同任务对种群进行分工的机制,提出了一种基于多任务子群协同的改进粒子群优化（Particle Swarm Optimization based on the Multi—tasking Subpopu—lation Cooperation,PSO-MSC）算法。借助该算法的快速收敛和全局寻优特性实现了最优路径规划。实验结果表明：该算法可以快速有效地实现战场环境下无人车辆的战术机动路径规划,且规划路径安全、平滑。     

载人登月软着陆制动段最优制导方法(英文)

提出一种解决软着陆制动段燃料最优制导以及闭环控制的方案.首先使用庞氏极大值原理将制动段燃料最优问题转化为一个初值问题,并使用遗传算法搜索求解;其次为了解决最优制导的闭环控制问题,将最优弹道作为标称弹道,使用RCS系统对轨道面内两个方向误差量进行解耦,分别使用极限环控制.仿真表明,所规划出的燃料最优弹道比阿波罗方案能节约159.7 kg的燃料,而闭环控制系统可以将初始1 000 m的位置误差和5 m/s的速度误差收敛到接近段入口误差要求以内,在闭环控制过程中,燃料消耗不大于87.75 kg,总体燃料消耗节约至少71.95 kg.     

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

Abstract

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.     

Decommissioning and paramilitary strategy in Northern Ireland: A problem compared

This study examines the problems of paramilitary decommissioning in Northern Ireland. It analyses why decommissioning has become so contentious in the Northern Ireland peace process. Decommissioning, though, is not a unique or intrinsically insurmountable problem. This is demonstrated by highlighting the issue in international context. Three examples of decommissioning in conflict resolution processes are assessed: the Lebanon, El Salvador and Mozambique. These varied examples do supply some limited lessons for Northern Ireland. This study argues that the explanation for the intractability of decommissioning in Northern Ireland resides, to a greater extent, in the tactical and strategic reasoning of the main paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland. The factors that condition their thinking, however, can be found in the nature of the peace process itself which provides the paramilitiaries with every incentive to retain possession of their weapons.     

Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.