Optimal location of a single service center of certain types

Hakimi has considered the problem of finding an optimal location for a single service center, such as a hospital or a police station. He used a graph theoretic model to represent the region being serviced. The communities are represented by the nodes while the road network is represented by the ares of the graph. In his work, the objective is one of minimizing the maximum of the shortest distances between the vertices and the service center. In the present work, the region being serviced is represented by a convex polygon and communities are spread over the entire region. The objective is to minimize the maximum of Euclidian distances between the service center and any point in the polygon. Two methods of solution presented are (i) a geometric method, and (ii) a quadratic programming formulation. Of these, the geometric method is simpler and more efficient. It is seen that for a class of problems, the geometric method is well suited and very efficient while the graph theoretic method, in general, will give only approximate solutions in spite of the increased efforts involved. But, for a different class of problems, the graph theoretic approach will be more appropriate while the geometric method will provide only approximate solutions though with ease. Finally, some feasible applications of importance are outlined and a few meaningful extensions are indicated.     

On some stocxastic tactical antisubmarine games

Mathematical models of tactical problems in Hntisubmarine Warfare (ASW) are developed. Specifically, a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force. player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2 is considered. The game consists of a sequence of moves and terminates when player 2 is tcaught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player choosa-s a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined, Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game (TSG). Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution), An iterative technique to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy is proposed. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs. To introduce more realism into the game several variations of the TSG are also considered. One variation is a finite TSG and linear programming techniques are employed to find the solution.     

A comparison of usage data among types of aircraft

It has long been an accepted proposition that base level usage df technical repair items for aircraft is related to program elements. The program element most often cited in this connection is flying hours. Evidence of this relationship on a line item basis, however, has been sparse. This study suggests that although the supposed relation is intuitively plausible, for most line items it cannot be effectively utilized in projecting base level requirements. The basis of this conclusion is an analysis of demand characteristics for technical repair items for a variety of naval aircraft.     

Scheduling workers in a constricted area

A generalization of the equi-partitioning problem, termed the 2D-Partition Problem, is formulated. The motivation is an aircraft maintenance scheduling problem with the following characteristics. The complete maintenance overhaul of a single aircraft requires the completion of some 350 tasks. These tasks require a varying number of technicians working at the same time. For large subsets of these 350 tasks, the constraining resource is physical space—tasks must be completed in a physical space of limited size such as the cockpit. Furthermore, there is no precedence relationship among the tasks. For each subset, the problem is to schedule the tasks to minimize makespan. Let m denote the maximum number of technicians that can work at the same time in the physical area under consideration. We present optimization algorithms for m = 2 and 3. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

An evaluation of scheduling heuristics for dynamic single-processor scheduling with early/tardy costs

In an endeavor to broaden the application of scheduling models to decisions involving the use of a manager's time we use simulation to investigate the performance of a number of simple algorithms (including eight priority rules and a construction heuristic) in a dynamic setting with tasks arriving (randomly) and scheduling decisions being made, over time. We compare these simple methods relative to a bound that uses an adjacent pairwise interchange algorithm. We model uncertainty in task durations, and costs being incurred for early and tardy task completion (representative of JIT settings). In addition to evaluating the efficacy of the scheduling rules and various preemption strategies (using ANOVA), we highlight the managerial implications of the effects of eight environmental parameters. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Heterogeneous discrete expenditure for diminishing returns

A probabilistic model is developed that applies to military bombardment, advertising for a mass audience, and other kinds of situations in which striking a target means that less of it is left to strike. The model provides the basis for decision analysis based on marginal gain in such circumstances. Heterogneous resources are considered as well as composite targets. All expenditures are quantized. The model has been developed as part of a computer-based military expert system, to replace a large complex set of expert opinions. In that application it sharply improves efficiency, yet conforms to major tenets of tactical doctrine.     

Geometric programming with multiplicative slack variables

A posynomial geometric programming problem formulated so that the number of objective function terms is equal to the number of primal variables will have a zero degree of difficulty when augmented by multiplying each constraint term by a slack variable and including a surrogate constraint composed of the product of the slack variables, each raised to an undetermined negative exponent or surrogate multiplier. It is assumed that the original problem is canonical. The exponents in the constraint on the product of the slack variables must be estimated so that the associated solution to the augmented problem, obtained immediately, also solves the original problem. An iterative search procedure for finding the required exponents, thus solving the original problem, is described. The search procedure has proven quite efficient, often requiring only two or three iterations per degree of difficulty of the original problem. At each iteration the well-known procedure for solving a geometric programming problem with a zero degree of difficulty is used and so computations are simple. The solution generated at each iteration is optimal for a problem which differs from the original problem only in the values of some of the constraint coefficients, so intermediate solutions provide useful information.     

Nuclear weapons,existential threats,and the stability–instability paradox

Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.