Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia

In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure.     

The “motivated bias” dilemma in warfare and intelligence

The goal of this article is to challenge the assumption of rationality in the behavior of decision-making units involved in security, defense, intelligence and warfare and to consider the influence of “motivated bias” in such instances. A review of motivational literature within international politics and a discussion of literature applying “motivated biases” to warfare and strategic surprise will offer an alternative view of the primacy of rationality in such decisions.     

Involving the elephant: technical isolation and the role of India in a possible solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis

Apart from North Korea, no state's nuclear program in the twenty-first century has raised more concern to international security than Iran's. While Iran insists that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purpose in line with Article IV of non-proliferation treaty, the USA and its allies insist that Iran has military intentions and called for sanctions. The failure of sanctions to deter Iran from its nuclear agenda had made many scholars and policy-makers call for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Situated within this debate, this paper positions itself as an antagonist to the preemptive airstrike option and argues that involving India in a possible nuclear “iron curtain” against Iran – a move known as technical isolation – remains the best option to the current nuclear crises.     

Scheduling to minimize the total compression and late costs

We consider a single-machine scheduling model in which the job processing times are controllable variables with linear costs. The objective is to minimize the sum of the cost incurred in compressing job processing times and the cost associated with the number of late jobs. The problem is shown to be NP-hard even when the due dates of all jobs are identical. We present a dynamic programming solution algorithm and a fully polynomial approximation scheme for the problem. Several efficient heuristics are proposed for solving the problem. Computational experiments demonstrate that the heuristics are capable of producing near-optimal solutions quickly. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 67–82, 1998     

A continuous-review inventory system with lost sales and variable lead time

Using a system-point (SP) method of level crossings, we derive the stationary distribution of the inventory level (stock on hand) in a continuous-review inventory system with compound Poisson demand, Erlang as well as hyperexponentially distributed lead times, and lost sales. This distribution is then used to formulate long-run average cost functions with/without a service level constraint. Some numerical results are also presented, and compared with the Hadley and Whitin heuristic. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 259–278, 1998     

Optimal scheduling of reader—systems

We consider a reader—writer system consisting of a single server and a fixed number of jobs (or customers) belonging to two classes. Class one jobs are called readers and any number of them can be processed simultaneously. Class two jobs are called writers and they have to be processed one at a time. When a writer is being processed no other writer or readers can be processed. A fixed number of readers and writers are ready for processing at time 0. Their processing times are independent random variables. Each reader and writer has a fixed waiting cost rate. We find optimal scheduling rules that minimize the expected total waiting cost (expected total weighted flowtime). We consider both nonpreemptive and preemptive scheduling. The optimal nonpreemptive schedule is derived by a variation of the usual interchange argument, while the optimal schedule in the preemptive case is given by a Gittins index policy. These index policies continue to be optimal for systems in which new writers enter the system in a Poisson fashion. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 483–495, 1998     

The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash

On 22 September 1979 two optical sensors on U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected a double-flash of light that appeared characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion conducted over the southern Atlantic or Indian Ocean. It became known as the Vela Incident, Event 747, or Alert 747. An anomaly between the amplitude of the two signals during the second pulse led a U.S. government expert panel established to assess the event to conclude in mid-1980 that a more likely explanation was the impact of a small meteoroid on the satellite, the debris from which reflected sunlight into the sensors' field of view. No model was presented to support the contention, and a similar anomaly—known as background modulation—was a given for the second pulse of all confirmed explosions detected by Vela, though beginning later. Nonetheless, this event has remained the subject of intense debate. This article reviews the evidence and presents an updated analysis of the original Vela signal based on recently declassified literature and on modern knowledge of interplanetary dust and hyper velocity impact. Given the geometry of the satellite, and that the bulk of the surface comprised solar panels, much of the debris from any collision would be carried away from the sensors' field of view. Thus, a meteoroid collision appears much less likely than previously assumed. The double flash is instead consistent with a nuclear explosion, albeit detected by an aged satellite for which background modulation was abnormal and/or commenced earlier, also seen in post-event SYSTEM tests. A companion paper to be published in 2018 presents radionuclide and hydroacoustic evidence supporting the conclusion that the Vela Incident was a nuclear weapon test explosion.