“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

Sole sourcing versus dual sourcing under stochastic demands and lead times

The use of a single vendor for each inventoried item is usually assumed in most of the inventory models. However, there are situations where the use of more than one vendor should be considered, especially when lead times are stochastic. This research presents a theoretical investigation of the effect of cost structures on the relative performance of sole-sourcing versus dual-sourcing inventory control policies. We show that except for cases where the ordering cost is high, the lead-time variability is low, or the customer service level is low, dual sourcing performs better than sole sourcing under the normally distributed demand and shifted-exponential lead times. Moreover, the computational results indicate the dual sourcing provides a better service level than sole sourcing at the optimal solutions, and that dual sourcing results in larger order quantities than sole sourcing, which suggests that attractive quantity discounts may not be in jeopardy when dual sourcing is employed. Finally, because it is generally known that multiple sourcing can enhance the competition among suppliers, material managers should consider splitting purchase orders when two equally qualified suppliers are available. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Reformulating zero-sum games with multiple goals

This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum multiple payoff game in which the objective is to minimize a player's total underachievement from a fixed set of goals. It is demonstrated that a previous formulation of this problem can be substantially simplified.