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471.
James A. Nathan 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):243-253
Robert S. McNamara [and Brian Van De Mark,] In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, NewYork:NewYork Times Books, Random House, 1995. Pp.xviii + 414. $27.50. ISBN 08129–2523–8. 相似文献
472.
A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles. 相似文献
473.
David A. Patten 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):879-906
Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo. 相似文献
474.
David A. Percox 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):46-101
Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency. 相似文献
475.
Nina A. Kollars 《战略研究杂志》2015,38(4):529-553
Wartime adaptation is a process of adjustment from the war you planned for to the one you have. This process of adjustment is done, in part, by the practitioners of war in the theater of conflict–soldier-led adaptation. Drawing upon two case studies of gun truck development in Iraq and Vietnam I argue that soldiers created networks in order to adapt to battlefield challenges and that the pattern of those networks carries implications for the likelihood of formal adoption by the organization. Simply put, the pattern of the flow of ideas, resources, and skills across the battlefield may affect the likelihood of bottom-up adaptation. 相似文献
476.
A. S. Andreou ? K. E. Parsopoulos ? M. N. Vrahatis § G. A. Zombanakis 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):481-495
The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey. 相似文献
477.
AbstractThe emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group's activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist. 相似文献
478.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet. 相似文献
479.
Lewis A. Dunn 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):143-172
This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference. 相似文献
480.
Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014 相似文献