One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

Optimal control of an M/G/1 queue with impatient priority customers

An optimal operating policy is characterized for the infinite‐horizon average‐cost case of a single server queueing control problem. The server may be turned on at arrival epochs or off at departure epochs. Two classes of customers, each of them arriving according to an independent Poisson processes, are considered. An arriving 1‐customer enters the system if the server is turned on upon his arrival, or if the server is on and idle. In the former case, the 1‐customer is selected for service ahead of those customers waiting in the system; otherwise he leaves the system immediately. 2‐Customers remain in the system until they complete their service requirements. Under a linear cost structure, this paper shows that a stationary optimal policy exists such that either (1) leaves the server on at all times, or (2) turns the server off when the system is empty. In the latter case, we show that the stationary optimal policy is a threshold strategy, this feature being commonplace in most of priority queueing systems and inventory models. However, the optimal policy in our model is determined by two thresholds instead of one. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 201–209, 2001     

A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975

Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo–Omani offensives conventionally.