Estimating the common location parameter of exponential distributions with censored samples

Consider the problem of estimating the common location parameter of two exponential distributions when censored samples are taken. The unique minimum variance unbiased estimator (UMVUE) is found along with an expression for its variance. The asymptotic distribution is given for a special case and a generalized Bayes property is exhibited. Extensions include the case of k > 2 populations. Also the UMVUE is found for P(Y > X) and certain reliability functions.     

A dynamic inventory system with recycling

This paper deals with a periodic review inventory system in which a constant proportion of stock issued to meet demand each period feeds back into the inventory after a fixed number of periods. Various applications of the model are discussed, including blood bank management and the control of reparable item inventories. We assume that on hand inventory is subject to proportional decay. Demands in successive periods are assumed to be independent identically distributed random variables. The functional equation defining an optimal policy is formulated and a myopic base stock approximation is developed. This myopic policy is shown to be optimal for the case where the feedback delay is equal to one period. Both cost and ordering decision comparisons for optimal and myopic policies are carried out numerically for a delay time of two periods over a wide range of input parameter values.     

Statistical analysis of a conventional fuze timer

In this paper, a statistical analytic model for evaluation of the performance of a standard electric bomb fuze timer is presented. The model is based on what is called a selective design assembly, where one item, namely, a resistor, is used to time the circuit. In such an assembly, the remaining components are chosen a priori from predetermined distributions. Based on the analysis, a general numerical integration scheme is utilized for assessing performance of the timer. The results of a computer simulation are also given. In the last section of the paper, a theory for evaluation of the yield of two or more timers designed to operate in sequence is derived. To appraise such a scheme, a numerical quadrature routine is developed.     

A note on the sensitivity of navy first term reenlistment to bonuses,unemployment and relative wages

Multiple regression analysis of first term reenlistment rates over the period 1968–1977 confirms previous findings that reenlistment is highly sensitive to unemployment at the time of reenlistment and shortly after enlistment, almost four years earlier. Bonuses, particularly lump sum bonuses, were also shown to be a significant determinant of reenlistment.     

Prologue to Suez: Anglo-American planning for military intervention in a Middle East war, 1955–1956

This article contributes yet another perspective to the Suez War – the strategic and military planning carried out since the end of the Second World War by the Western Allies for the contingency of a new world conflict against the Soviet bloc. The Middle East was of vital strategic significance. Colonel Nasser's announcement of the Czech arms deal in September 1955 triggered the countdown to a new war in the region. London and Washington urgently drew up contingency plans for intervention, both with economic sanctions and armed force. Joint staff talks were held in Washington from March to August 1956. They were halted just two months before the United Kingdom decided to collude with France and Israel to attack Egypt.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.     

Linking a throughput simulation to a systems dynamics simulation to assess the utility of a US Navy foreign humanitarian aid mission

The success of any humanitarian aid mission is generally measured by the timeliness of critical supplies that are delivered to the affected area. However, a more interesting analysis may be to determine the effect of the aid on the overall satisfaction of the local population. The authors' research focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid to a notional region that was decimated by flooding with ships, landing craft and security personnel provided by the US Navy and Marines. While the research effort addressed naval force structure, the focus of the research was: (1) to assess different delivery methods for the aid; and (2) to determine how the aid delivery impacted the overall satisfaction of the local population. To examine both concerns, two simulation models were developed, with one examining the throughput of aid delivered during the operation, and the other the satisfaction of the population based on the humanitarian aid effort.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014