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111.
Juan F. Vargas 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):563-579
I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. 相似文献
112.
P. G. Pugh 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(1):39-57
It is intrinsic to the nature of military competition that the unit acquisition costs of defence systems rise generation by generation. Traditional “bottom‐up” methods of cost‐estimating cannot meet the increasing demands for extensive studies of many options before commencing design and, while “top‐down” estimating techniques are an improvement, in particular by reducing the time required for preparing estimates, they also are inadequate to meet current requirements. A new method has been devised, therefore, further developing “top‐down” methods using Bayesian techniques to make best use of the available information, whether certain or uncertain, and its accuracy established by example. 相似文献
113.
Edward G. Keating 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(2):191-223
This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs. 相似文献
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ERIC G BERMAN 《African Security Review》2013,22(1):5-14
On 7 July 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lomé Peace Agreement to end the civil war. A central component of this agreement called for the RUF to disarm. A year later, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was in custody and the future of the peace accord in grave doubt. Far from disarming, all parties have been rearming at an alarming rate, in contravention of a 1997 UN arms embargo and despite a regional moratorium on the production, procurement and sale of small arms and light weapons. The political and security situation remains extremely fragile. This article explores the ease with which small arms and light weapons can be obtained, and questions the efficacy of existing armament and disarmament policies. Given the availability of arms, the weakness of the current government, the relative strength of the RUF, and the fluidity of alliances among the country's armed groups, the likelihood of continued conflict in Sierra Leone is great. 相似文献
116.
Heather Williams 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):493-498
George F. Kennan: An American Life, by John Lewis Gaddis. The Penguin Press, 2011. 784 pages, $40. 相似文献
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Timothy D. Sisk 《Civil Wars》2013,15(4):7-20
Syria's slide into sectarian civil war in 2011 raises a new fundamental knowledge question about the conditions under which power-sharing pacts can be clinched as an approach to war termination. When intrastate conflicts escalate into violent sectarian struggles, power-sharing is a likely basis of an eventual political settlement in situations where partition is off the table. This article contends that there remain two puzzling knowledge gaps about power-sharing as the basis for peace agreements to end civil wars: first, the specific conditions under which elites find it in their own interest to share power with bitter adversaries rather than fight on the battlefield, and second, how war-ending elite-negotiated pacts may evolve into more enduring social contracts. These puzzles, critical for policymakers and still unresolved in the scholarly literature, suggest the need to develop more contingent- and context-specific knowledge if research findings are to more capably contribute to peacemaking efforts. 相似文献
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