The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement

As a consequence of the rapid growth of Soviet maritime power during the 1960s, hazardous incidents at sea and in the air became a regular part of the Cold War. Eventually, both Washington and Moscow came to recognize the importance of an agreement limiting this perilous set of interactions, resulting in the Incidents at Sea Agreement that was signed in May 1972. The set of rules and procedures agreed upon helped to calm tensions in subsequent crises and provides ample lessons for placing reasonable limits on other tense maritime rivalries.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 19, 2012

The U.S. Congress, charged with overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons, including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.     

ON ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Using the ITERATE dataset, we explore the origins of transnational terrorist activity, from 1982 through 1997, in 118 countries. We model terrorism, not as a function of a nation’s ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization, but as an independent measure of perceived ethnic tensions. When we control for institutional quality, evidence that political rights and civil liberties mitigate the terrorism‐producing effects of ethnic tensions exists only since 1990. Economic freedoms, on the other hand, robustly reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating in ethnically tense societies.     

A stochastic assignment problem

There are n boxes with box i having a quota value Balls arrive sequentially, with each ball having a binary vector attached to it, with the interpretation being that if X_i = 1 then that ball is eligible to be put in box i. A ball's vector is revealed when it arrives and the ball can be put in any alive box for which it is eligible, where a box is said to be alive if it has not yet met its quota. Assuming that the components of a vector are independent, we are interested in the policy that minimizes, either stochastically or in expectation, the number of balls that need arrive until all boxes have met their quotas. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:23–31, 2015     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.