Evasion costs and the theory Of conscription

This paper examines the trade and military relationship between two countries which have a common military enemy. The paper explains how the former two countries, which are military allies and trading partners, share the burden of defence against the third country. It demonstrates how the defence production of a country may hurt its ally because the latter country's terms of trade can be deteriorated. Whether or not a smaller ally spends less on defence is analyzed. Also analyzed is the effects of the reactions of the enemy country on the trade between the two allies and their welfare.     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.     

Minimizing Public Sector Corruption: The Economics of Crime,Identity Economics,and Money Laundering

Abstract

This paper offers a simple strategic framework to help governments identify various policy mechanisms to minimize public sector corruption. The paper offers a formal model that blends the economics of crime with identity economics and money laundering. It presents a partial equilibrium framework that focuses on a representative public official engaged in a mix of legal and illegal effort. The model introduces various levers a government might use to impact the costs and benefits of illegal effort. The ultimate goal is to help turn volatile vicious cycles of political instability, into steady virtuous cycles of stability, growth, and sustainable development.     

Facing ‘people's war’: Moltke the elder and Germany's military options after 1871

Prof. Dr Werner Hahlweg (ed.), Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege. Neunzehnte Auflage. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. Pp. 1406; DM. 98.00.*

Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918. The Live and Let Live System. London: The Macmillan Press, 1980. Pp. 226; £15.

Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet: Earl Beatty. London: Collins, 1980. Pp. 430; £12.95.

R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945. London: Europa Publications, 1980. Pp. 250; £12.50.

Martin Binkin and Irene Kynakopoulos, Youth or Experience? Manning the Modern Military. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980. Pp. 84; NP.

Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett (eds), The Political Influence of the Military. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. 508; £22.50; £6.90 (paperback).

Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815–1914. Themes in British Social History. London: Longman, 1980. Pp. 318; £9.95, £5.75 (paperback).

Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino‐Soviet‐American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique. London: Frances Pinter, 1980. Pp. 384; £15.     

Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?

This chapter discusses the impact Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have on the security situation in Afghanistan, specifically in countering the terrorist threat and in counter-narcotics.

The Afghan people define the lack of security as their country's greatest problem. The terrorist activities of groups opposed to the central government and the political process compounded by violence related to the opium trade are seen as the main sources of insecurity. The authors argue that, currently, PRTs should not assume active counterterrorism as an additional main area of operation. The complexity of Afghanistan's security environment and the pressure to have PRTs involved in the counter-narcotics effort underscore the necessity of local knowledge and experience in the PRTs. Participation of indigenous actors, such as NGOs, in the PRT-organisational structure could provide this required expertise.     

Reviews

Ian Castle and Ian Knight, Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879. Greenhill Books, London 1994, Pp.256, 85 illus, 6 maps, index. £17.95. ISBN 1–85367–180–0.

Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Pp.263, selected biblio, index. $45/£30 (cloth); $14.95/£12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–691–03368 and 00068–9.

Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau (Research and Action) Ltd., 1992. Pp.212, 7 maps, photographs, glossary, sources/further reading, index. £17.99 ISBN 0–906156–70‐X and ‐71–8.

David A. Charters (ed.), Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1994. Pp.viii+220. NP.

Joachim Remak, A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. Pp.xvi+221, 6 map's, 68 illus, biblio, index. $24.95/£16.95.