Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages

We consider two opponents that compete in developing asymmetric technologies where each party's technology is aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other's technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in commercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market share, in our case the competition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast with the “winner‐takes‐all” assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume that the party that wins the race gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology. We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one‐sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two‐sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so that both parties have no incentive to change their investments. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 128–145, 2012     

Numerical simulation of warhead transportation

The new numerical approach for analysis of the warhead transportations is suggested.This approach allows to control the warhead operability before its experimental analysis.The approach is implemented by the adequate models for the software ANSYS.Analysis of the loads at land operations and trans-portations of the warhead by natural roads,water and aviation allows to obtain the maximal values of loads,which are used in numerical simulations of the warhead.These loads give an opportunity to analyze the operability and the fatigue strength of the cartridge warhead.The numerical simulations of the attachments of the warhead combat elements are performed on the basis of the suggested method.The data of the numerical simulations verifies the operability of the fastener system of the warhead combat elements.     

Scheduling and lot streaming in two‐machine open shops with no‐wait in process

We study the problem of minimizing the makespan in no‐wait two‐machine open shops producing multiple products using lot streaming. In no‐wait open shop scheduling, sublot sizes are necessarily consistent; i.e., they remain the same over all machines. This intractable problem requires finding sublot sizes, a product sequence for each machine, and a machine sequence for each product. We develop a dynamic programming algorithm to generate all the dominant schedule profiles for each product that are required to formulate the open shop problem as a generalized traveling salesman problem. This problem is equivalent to a classical traveling salesman problem with a pseudopolynomial number of cities. We develop and test a computationally efficient heuristic for the open shop problem. Our results indicate that solutions can quickly be found for two machine open shops with up to 50 products. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Single- and multiple-processor models for minimizing completion time variance

This article concerns the scheduling of n jobs around a common due date, so as to minimize the average total earliness plus total lateness of the jobs. Optimality conditions for the problem are developed, based on its equivalence to an easy scheduling problem. It seems that this problem inherently has a huge number of optimal solutions and an algorithm is developed to find many of them. The model is extended to allow for the availability of multiple parallel processors and an efficient algorithm is developed for that problem. In this more general case also, the algorithm permits great flexibility in finding an optimal schedule.     

Book reviews

Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. By Honore M. Catudal. Mansell, London (1988), ISBN 0–7201–2000–4, £25.00

The Military: More Than Just a Job? Edited by Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood. Pergamon‐Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–034321‐X, £17.00 ($30.00)

Douglas Haig, 1861–1928. By Gerard J. de Groot. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), ISBN 004 4401922, £20.00

Defence Policy Making. A Comparative Analysis. Edited by G. M. Dillon. Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0–715–1268–5, £10.95

The Future of U.K. Air Power. Edited by P. Sabin. Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–035825‐X (hardcover), 0–08–036256–7 (flexicover), hardcover £18.95 ($34.00), flexicover £9.95 ($17.95)     

Book reviews

Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq. by Davina Miller, London: Cassell, 1996, ISBN 0-304-33852-4 (hbk), £40.00, 04-33853-2 (pbk), £11.99.

The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-1941. by Trevor Allen, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7165-2616-6, (hbk) £17.50.

Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Greqory J. Rattray (eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

Asia-Pacific Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities. Edited by Gary Klintworth. Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, ISBN 0-582-80321-7, £24.99.

Masters of War, Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. by Robert Buzzanco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-521-48046-9 (hbk), £29.95

Controlling the Arms Trade: the West Versus the Rest. By Paul Cornish, London: Bowerdean Publishing Co., 1996, ISBN 0-906097-44-4 (pbk), £9.99.

Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World. by Loch K. Johnson, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-300-06611-2 (hbk), £22.50.     

Political games

A modification of the Shapley value is suggested, which takes into account the fact that (due to personal affinities among the players) certain coalitions are more easily formed than others. This is done by assigning to each player a point in space, and looking at the distances between pairs of points. The method seems to be especially applicable to voting games among political parties (in, e. g., parliaments), and, for such games, gives a value which is considerably easier to compute than the usual Shapley value. Some examples are considered.     

A linear programming solution to the generalized rectangular distance weber problem

The Weber Problem generalized to the location of several new points with respect to existing points is formulated as a linear programming problem under the assumption that distances are rectangular. The dual problem is then formulated and subsequently reduced to a problem with substantially fewer variables and constraints than required by an existent alternative linear programming formulation. Flows may exist between new as well as between new and existing points. Linear constraints can be imposed to restrict the location of new points. Pairwise constraints limiting distances between new points and between new and existing points can also be accommodated.