America's regions and US foreign policy

Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp.xvi + 353, biblio., figs, maps, index. $55 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). ISBN 0–226–81302–9.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in Turkey

This paper investigates the budgetary trade-off structure of security (defence+internal security) expenditures in Turkey for the period 1983-1998. A modified version of Todaro's distributive share index of social welfare is used to quantify the impacts on the growth of primary budget expenditures of Security, Education, Health, General Administration, Infrastructure, and Social Services. We find that defence expenditures dominate overall security expenditures and are less affected in times of bottlenecks in the economy. A systematic pattern of negative budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in terms of other components is not identified. We also analyse the expenditures of the Defence Industry Support Fund in an attempt to find the cost of the modernisation program to the economy.     

The Cyprus puzzle and the Greek - Turkish arms race: Forecasting developments using genetically evolved fuzzy cognitive maps

The scope of this paper is to forecast the extent to which a settlement of the Cyprus issue may be possible given the decisions taken during the Copenhagen EU summit. It aims, in addition, at investigating the possibilities of improvement in Greek-Turkish relations which may lead, in turn, to reducing the arms race between the two countries. The paper uses a Genetically Evolved Certainty Neuron Fuzzy Cognitive Map algorithm to consider a number of scenarios examining the possible reactions of all sides involved in the Cyprus issue, namely Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot community and the international environment. All simulation exercises suggest that the Greek and the Cypriot side should not necessarily rely on the decisions taken during the Copenhagen summit conference. The forecasts point out, in addition, that the optimism of the Greek government concerning the outlook of its relations with Turkey, and a subsequent reduction of the arms race against it, is far from being justified.     

Investigating optimal replacement of aging air force systems

An availability‐oriented approach has been developed to decide when to replace an aging system. For an existing system, it is optimal to operate another year if and only if the incremental cost per available year is less than the lifetime average cost per available year of a new aircraft. We illustrate our approach using United States Air Force KC‐135 tanker data. In demonstrating our approach, we find it will be optimal to replace the KC‐135 by the end of the decade.     

Specialization in defence forces

The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform‐sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest‐link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non‐optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer‐to‐most‐desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.     

Rent‐seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation*

This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent‐seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances.