导管螺旋桨敞水性能的预报和比较

借助于计算流体力学软件,对导管螺旋桨的敞水性能进行了数值模拟,得到了在不同网格模型和湍流模型下导管螺旋桨的正车敞水性能曲线,通过与试验图谱的对比分析,发现Wilcoxk-ω模型更适合于导管螺旋桨的敞水性能计算,并且采用结构化网格和非结构化网格相结合的计算方法能够满足导管螺旋桨敞水性能预报的工程精度要求。同时,当网格中存在少量高度倾斜的网格单元时,在不影响计算收敛的情况下,仍能将计算误差控制在10%以内。此外,如果要获得更为精确的计算结果,应提高网格质量,尽量使用结构化网格,并将近壁面网格加密,合理控制壁面附近的Y+值。虽然网格数量的增加并不总是意味着计算误差的减少,但合理控制网格细密度能够获得更为可信的计算结果。     

The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.     

具有全局收敛性的盲均衡算法

为了解决传统的自适应均衡技术需发送训练序列的问题,采用盲均衡技术,利用接收信号本身的特征使均衡器收敛。提出了一种新的盲均衡算法(C&D算法),该算法将CRIMNO算法和判决引导(Decision Directed,DD)算法相结合,利用信号序列间的互不相关特性,从而使其具有全局收敛性能。实验结果表明:与CRIMNO算法相比,在相同的信噪比下,该算法具有收敛快速、运算量少和残留误差小的特点。     

艰难的“氢弹决策”

第二次世界大战后,美苏展开了长达40余年的冷战,以核武器为重要标志的军备竞赛,如同“达摩克利斯之剑”,将全世界都笼罩在“第三次世界大战”、“核冬天”的阴影之下。1950年1月,美国总统杜鲁门作出研发氢弹的决定,成为一项在整个冷战期间具有里程碑意义的战略决策。     

基于马尔可夫过程的坦克火力随机对抗模型

根据小规模坦克火力对抗中所具有的马尔可夫性特点,将该过程视为离散状态、离散时间的马尔可夫随机过程(马尔可夫链),由此建立了坦克与反坦克武器系统之间一对一对抗的随机格斗模型,并给出双方获胜概率和平均对抗回合数的计算公式。最后通过实例验证了模型的有效性。该模型克服了轮流对抗不符合战场实际的缺点,为分队指挥员在射击策略的选择和分队火力运用上的快速决策提供了较为精确的量化依据。     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Information security: Designing a stochastic‐network for throughput and reliability

Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Designing and pricing menus of extended warranty contracts

Extended warranties provide “piece of mind” to a consumer in that product failures which occur after the base warranty expires are rectified at little or no cost. They also provide an additional source of revenue for manufacturers or third‐party providers, such as retailers or insurance providers, and help cultivate consumer loyalty. In this article, we analyze a number of extended warranty contracts which differ in design, including restrictions on deferrals and renewals. With the use of dynamic programming, we compute the optimal strategy for a consumer with perfect information and determine the optimal pricing policy for the provider given the consumer's risk characterization. We also provide insight into when different contracts should be issued. Finally, we illustrate how profits can be dramatically increased by offering menus of warranty contracts, as opposed to stand alone contracts, with the use of integer programming. Surprisingly, risk‐taking consumers provide the greatest benefit to offering menus. These insights can help a company develop a comprehensive warranty planning strategy for given products or product lines. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009